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Executive Summary 
 
This report is the first of three reports and part of a two year project entitled Establishing 
water markets in northern Australia: a study to assess feasibility and consequences of 
market-based mechanisms of water delivery undertaken through the Australian National 
University’s Crawford School of Economics and Government. The Tropical Rivers and 
Coastal Knowledge (TRaCK) hub funded this project under Theme 6.1 “Sustainable 
Enterprises”. This research is being undertaken in collaboration with the North Australian 
Indigenous Land and Sea Management Alliance (NAILSMA). This first report provides 
analysis of current institutional arrangements and constraints affecting the establishment 
of water markets across tropical Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia, 
(with focus on the Gulf, Timor and North East drainage divisions). 
 
Research needs were identified by TRaCK and NAILSMA (and the Indigenous Water 
Policy Group), and from this structured interview questions were developed. Data 
collection involved a review of literature from a number of different sources 
(government, media and scholarly articles) and utilised qualitative interviews with 42 
State, Territory, Commonwealth government officials, land council representatives and 
experts. Data was collected through structured personal interviews using an open ended 
format; telephone interviews were undertaken when face-to-face interviews were not 
possible. Most interviews were audio recorded, with transcripts sent back to all 
interviewees for confirmation.  Findings were developed comparing multiple data 
sources, and sent out to interviewees for their feedback. Changes were made where 
appropriate and from this the final report was then produced.  
 
The research findings highlight that the jurisdictions analysed have the framework in 
place to support water markets, but some States have more robust frameworks in place 
(such as Queensland)— however, it is emphasised that the development and importance 
of water markets is influenced by the demand for water in each of the jurisdictions. This 
study found that all jurisdictions have focused on planning in the north and have taken a 
precautionary approach to implementing water reform. This approach has been 
implemented using best available knowledge, but it is informed by a recognition that 
generally there is a limited understanding of the characteristics of water resources across 
the north, as well as related ecological and cultural values.  Several features are shared 
across jurisdictions including a desire to support Indigenous access to water that may be 
accommodated through an Indigenous reserve (which may include water for drinking, 
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customary and consumptive purposes) or through an entitlement, or a blend of both.  
Including Indigenous people in water planning has been hampered by community 
capacity in the north and relevant governments are constrained in overcoming this 
challenge by limited resources. A key finding of the study is that inter-basin transfers are 
not, in general, supported by interviewees and, at present, cross border trading is highly 
circumscribed. Some concern was also raised about inclusion of mining activities in water 
markets.  
 
Various constraints were identified to the establishment of water markets across northern 
Australia. The key constraints identified generally across the north include physical limits 
to trade, knowledge gaps and legislative and institutional frameworks. In the Northern 
Territory, interviewees identified community attitude and values as being a major 
limitation on the establishment of water markets. In Queensland, the Wild Rivers Act 
2005 which prescribes the intensity of water-based development in the north was viewed 
as a significant barrier to water trading. In Western Australia, land tenure issues, 
particularly native title processes were seen as being the most significant limitation (albeit 
indirect) to the establishment of water markets in the north. Despite these constraints, 
many respondents recognised that establishing a robust and cost effective water 
management framework has the potential to support sustainable development outcomes 
across the north.  
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Glossary 
 
Aboriginal freehold Land designated under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 
(1976) (Northern Territory) for Indigenous traditional 
owners in the Northern Territory 
 
Aquifer      An underground geological formation which can yield 
quantities of groundwater for extraction. 
 
Cap   The limit set on volumes of water available for 
extraction in a consumptive pool. 
 
Consumptive pool   The actual volume of water made available for 
consumptive use, which generally set out in a water 
plan for the specific resource.  
 
Consumptive Use   Water made available for private use, for both 
commercial and personal activities.  
 
Native Title   Those rights and processes accorded under the Native 
Title Act (1993) (Commonwealth) to Indigenous 
Australians.  
 
Regulated system  A water resource where use is regulated through water 
infrastructure (such as storage and distribution 
channels). 
 
Supplemented scheme  In Queensland this term is used to describe water 
regulated through water infrastructure (such as storage 
and distribution channels). 
 
Temporary trade   The trade of seasonal water allocations which involves 
the transfer of whole or part of an entitlement in the 
season (or future seasons). In Queensland this is known 
as a seasonal water assignment. 
 
Unregulated system  A water resource where water is not distributed to users 
through infrastructure.  
 
Unsupplemented water In Queensland this term is used to describe a water 
resource where water is not distributed to users through 
infrastructure.  
 
Water access entitlement  An ongoing entitlement to exclusive access to a share of 
water from a specific consumptive pool defined in a 
water plan.  
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Water allocation   The amount of water provided in a licence to use or for 
water access entitlements in a given period as identified 
in the rules of the specific water plan.  
 
Water plan      A statutory plan or government endorsed water 
allocation plan for both surface and groundwater 
systems which is developed using scientific assessment 
and done in consultation with stakeholders to support 
sustainable water use. 
 
Wild Rivers Declarations to preserve a river system under Wild 
Rivers Act (2005) (Queensland) which limits 
development  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Tropical Rivers and Coastal Knowledge network (TRaCK) research hub 
identified the need for research under Theme 6 “Enterprise Development” to examine 
the feasibility and viability of market-based instruments for water allocation in a north 
Australian context, with focus on the Timor Sea, Gulf of Carpentaria and North East 
Coast drainage divisions (see Appendix 1 for a map of the area which is from Broome 
to Cairns and north). This project identifies the conditions required for robust water 
markets, compares these to conditions present in north Australia, and if appropriate 
suggests alternative mechanisms more suitable to existing conditions in northern 
Australia. An assessment of the costs and benefits will be made at the end of the two 
year project, using efficiency, effectiveness and equity criteria. The aim of this report 
is to support policy and decision makers with a better understanding of perceptions 
and regulations in the north.  
1.1 Project Overview 
 
This study, entitled “Establishing water markets in northern Australia: a study to 
assess feasibility and consequences of market-based mechanisms of water delivery,” 
is a two year project, funded through, theme 6.1 of TRaCK.  There are three tasks for 
this project: 
1. Analyse current institutional arrangements and constraints for establishing 
water markets across Queensland, NT and Western Australia, 
2. Analyse key stakeholder attitudes and values relating to water trading and 
consideration of the implications for the establishment of markets, 
3. Assess the costs and benefits of introducing water trading to northern 
Australia ensuring consideration of efficiency, effectiveness and equity 
criteria.  
 
In line with the terms of reference of this project, this report, task 1, provides an 
analysis of existing institutional arrangements and identifies the constraints in creating 
water markets across northern Australia. This report presents the views and opinions 
of decision makers and experts at a Commonwealth and State/Territory level on 
institutional arrangements and constraints for the establishment of water markets in 
northern Australia. This first phase commenced on December 10 2008, with field 
work commencing in late February 2009 and completed May 01 2009. Interviews 
were conducted with representatives from government, land councils and experts in 
the field, to augment literature review. 
  
This first section of this report provides an overview of the project. The second 
section provides background to the institutional setting both at a national and 
state/territory level. The third section covers the methodology for this report. The 
fourth section provides findings from analysis and the fifth section provides 
conclusions and further research.  
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2.  Water Reform  
 
The impetus for institutional reform in the management of Australia’s water resources 
was a result of factors such as increasing scarcity coupled with growing demand, 
climate change and enhanced awareness of environmental costs (Grafton and 
Peterson, 2007). The potential to trade water has existed in certain states in Australia 
for quite some time– for instance South Australia, Victoria and New South Wales 
took steps to unbundle land and water to encourage trading over two decades ago 
(Brooks and Harris, 2008). A national approach to water reform, in particular a 
common approach to developing the institutional underpinnings of market based 
water allocation, was proposed during the establishment of Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) (1994) Water Reform Framework. While reforms by States up 
until then were recognised by COAG as improving water efficiency outcomes, the 
COAG (1994) framework aimed to facilitate change in the sustainable management 
and allocation of water through centralized coordination. Several targets were 
identified in COAG 1994, these included (among others): steps to create a clear 
property right to water, expanding market based mechanisms to water allocation 
(including interstate trade) and the creation of environmental flows (COAG, 1994).  
 
In 1995 the National Competition Policy was established to further the commitments 
to water reform in areas such as institutional arrangements, cost recovery and pricing, 
ecological water, stakeholder consultation and engagement and the expansion of 
allocation and tradable entitlements (Pigram, 2006). In 2004, building on COAG 
1994, an Inter-governmental Agreement, the National Water Initiative (NWI), was 
approved to enhance the national water reform agenda. Under the NWI, state and 
territory governments (with the exception of WA until 2006) signed on to commit to 
implement (among other things) the following: 
• Develop statutory water plans that provide sufficient water for the 
environment and report on this 
• Introduce nationally compatible and reliable registers to record water 
entitlements (and their trade) 
• Create a risk sharing framework to allow for potential change in the level of 
water available to users 
• Establish standards and policy for water accounting, metering and monitoring 
to accurately report use and improve efficiency 
• Best practice pricing (actual cost of storage and delivery) and institutional 
arrangements to promote greater efficiency in use and expand the trade in 
water  
• Remove barriers to markets 
(National Water Initiative, 2004) 
The overarching aim of the NWI was to further the national framework for the 
management of water, establishing common regulatory and planning systems for both 
surface and groundwater (and recognizing the connection between these systems). 
This change reflected a “paradigm shift in the underlying logic of water management 
from community development to one based on property rights (Connell, Robins and 
Dovers, 2007: 127).  But this property regime was to occur with a clear recognition of 
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social, environmental and cultural outcomes and impacts. A sustainable level of water 
extraction is sought under the NWI and use is to be guided by a rigorous planning 
framework which develops plans (defining allocations) supported in legislation and 
regulation (Gentle and Olszak, 2007). Clauses 52-54 in the NWI also address 
“Indigenous Access to Water,” and seek to involve Indigenous peoples in water 
planning (wherever possible) to account for water used by those with native title for 
cultural purposes (NWI, 2004). Jackson and Morrison (2007) argue that to include 
Indigenous people in water planning and to account for Indigenous water requires 
improved understanding among decision makers around the diverse Indigenous 
perspectives on country, Indigenous values and uses of water and to the scope of these 
actual rights and interests to water.  NAILSMA (2008) through the Indigenous Water 
Policy Group (IWPG) suggests that often native title rights and interests are narrowly 
construed and that Indigenous rights to water extend to “commercial and customary 
rights” (NAISLMA, 2008: 4). In the context of northern Australia the existence of 
native title rights, as well as the interaction of a land rights regime, will be critical 
issues in furthering the implementation of NWI reforms.  
 
A new institutional framework envisaged by the NWI (with register, metering, 
statutory planning, accounting), and coordinated by the Commonwealth, encourages 
the use of market mechanisms to allocate water within a planning framework. This 
framework should take into consideration third party impacts, the environment and 
Indigenous access to water (as well as native title interests).  
2.1 Institutional Setting 
 
Each State and Territory committed to a process of institutional change in how water 
is governed, managed and allocated under the NWI. The focus on reform has been 
supported by the National Water Commission (NWC) assessing the pace of 
implementation across Australia in its Biennial Assessment of Progress in 
Implementation of the National Water Initiative (NWC, 2007; 2009); and, 
summarising trading in each State and Territory, with the development of an 
Australian Water Markets Report, 2007-2008 (NWC, 2008). There has been a strong 
focus in NWI reform that has largely been concentrated on the pressing conditions in 
the Murray Darling Basin (MDB) (Bjornlund, 2003; NWC, 2008) and developing the 
Murray Darling Basin Water Agreement (Pigram, 2006). By contrast, water markets 
in northern Australia are limited in size and saw little trading or development of 
plans— for example in 2007-8 there was no trading in the Northern Territory 
although arrangements are currently in place to facilitate trade (NWC, 2008).  
 
The role of the NWC is to drive the implementation of water reform and inform 
expenditure of the Australian Government Water Fund, which is made up of the 
Raising National Water Standards, Water Smart Australia, and Australian Water 
Funds Communities programmes. The Raising National Water Standards program 
aims to invest in and enhance the measuring and monitoring of water supply and use. 
In 2004, COAG sought to develop a national register system and States and 
Territories committed to this under paragraph 59 of the NWI (NWI, 2004). In the 
Biennial Assessment of progress by the NWC (2007), the pace of implementation was 
examined for key elements of the reform agenda, which included the water access 
entitlement and planning framework, water markets and trading, best practice pricing, 
integrated management of water for environmental and other public benefit, water 
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resource accounting, and urban water reform— the assessment determined that  
“…governments have made considerable progress in implementing the NWI over its 
first two years” (NWC, 2007: 7). The 2009 Biennial Assessment identified 
considerable progress in water reform across Australia (NWC, 2009) using four 
central themes: (1) understanding our water resources and use (includes water 
planning, accounting and surface and groundwater connectivity); (2) ensuring the 
health of river and groundwater systems (environmental flow and mechanisms to deal 
with over-allocation and overuse); (3) enhancing the productivity and efficiency of 
water use (looking at water entitlements, markets and pricing); and (4) dealing with 
challenges face by rural and urban communities (addressing structural adjustment and 
reform, risk assignment and urban water) (NWC 2009). In terms of water markets and 
trading the NWC found that “Outside the MDB, planning and entitlement reforms 
need to be pushed along to develop new and expanded markets for water (NWC, 
2009: x).   
2.1.1 Water markets and trading 
 
The national water reform agenda seeks to drive the development of institutional, 
regulatory and policy change to support water trading so as to facilitate the 
reallocation of water to more productive uses, enhance efficiency and sustainable 
outcomes (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Included in this reform are the 
development of a specified property right, a register, metering, water accounting, and 
a planning framework which guides allocations and provides for the environment as 
well as third party impacts.  
 
The NWC Australian Water Markets Report 2007-2008 summarises trading activity 
in each State and Territory.  The report estimated that the total value of trade in the 
2007-2008 water year was $1.68 billion, and almost 1600 GL of allocated water was 
traded Australia wide, though the MDB states (including Queensland’s non-Basin 
markets) dominate with 99% of Australia’s total water allocation trade and comprises 
99.9 % of total market volume (NWC, 2008). 
 
Institutional Arrangements for Water Markets 
 
Clauses 58-63 in the NWI sets out the ‘blueprint’ for water markets and trading, with 
an action plan guiding the implementation of a trading regime (NWI, 2004). Water 
trading is viewed by the NWC as being the “centrepiece” of reform driven by the 
NWI (NWC, 2008: iii). Kemper (2001: 1) identifies a water market as “… an 
arrangement in which holders of water rights trade them with each other or to outside 
parties.” Water markets have been proposed as mechanisms to enhance the efficient 
use and reallocation to most productive use for water resources (Bjornlund, 2003). 
The NWC defines a permanent water trade as “transfer of water access entitlement 
from one legal entity to another, with or without a change in location” (NWC, 2008: 
xii), while a temporary trade is an “assignment of water allocation from one 
authorised user to another, or between water accounts held by the same water user, 
with or without a change in location” (NWC, 2008: xiii).  
 
Key issues in terms of the design of water markets include: types of water resource 
(groundwater or surface water) traded, connectivity, the nature of use and needs of 
entitlement holders, and if there exists non market use and informal trading. Effective 
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water markets require suitable institutional arrangements that include: well specified 
and tradable water rights, an administrative system which competently processes and 
registers trades between individuals, infrastructure that delivers water reliably and a 
common water accounting system (Kemper, 2001). The NWC (2009) offer four 
elements that are required for water markets: that water be tradable without 
constraints (except rules that seek to efficiently manage ecological or hydrological 
limitations), the market be a level playing field with insignificant transaction costs, a 
diverse range of water products are offered to participants, and there are no 
externalities on third parties (such as the environment and other users). A report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) proposes that for successful markets the following 
conditions are required: a clear right to the commodity, transparent and logical rules, 
credible and accessible information for traders, a familiar method of exchange, 
efficient administrative processes, low transaction cost vis-à-vis commodity value, an 
ability for users to enter markets, and the market itself must be accepted by the 
community. However, to make a market work there is required: “competition between 
different parties, for the rights to some commodity or other form of property of which 
there is a finite supply” (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006: 37). Howe, Schurmeier and 
Shaw Jr. (1986) identify six criteria for effective water markets that allow for 
reallocation to most productive use— these are flexibility in reallocation, security of 
entitlement tenure, a real opportunity cost, and certainty in process outcome, a 
perception of equity and fairness, and reflecting public values.  In assessing the MDB, 
Turral et al. (2005) argue that significant progress is still required to meet the criteria 
set out in Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw Jr. (1986), which focus on institutional 
arrangements as important to achieve outcomes, and suggest that “where effective 
arrangements for water entitlements, water accounting and water allocation do not 
exist, it is very unlikely that sustainable water trading can be meaningfully 
established” (Turral et al., 2005: 8). Stoeckl et al. (2008) argue that for effective 
markets there is required perfect knowledge available for players, competition in the 
market, no externalities, minimal cost enforcement and cost efficient water 
infrastructure. Literature emphasises that institutional arrangements are crucial to the 
function of successful water markets, but the literature also underscores that an 
equally important condition is competition among a sufficient number of users for the 
resource. 
 
Kemper and Simpson (1998) identify the following key elements for water markets in 
the Colorado: a property or user right to water (definition, allocation, measurement 
and return flows), a contracting mechanism, availability and access to information, 
and an administering and enforcing agency. Kemper and Simpson (1998) articulate 
that in establishing water markets these elements were often adapted to localised 
settings in what is usually a politically driven process— outcomes from this include 
limits on trade out of the irrigation district and constraints on ownership rights to non 
land owners. Limits imposed on trade that are not based on bio-physical limitations 
have also been identified by Bjornlund (2004) and the NWC (2009) in the MDB. 
Drawing on work by Putnam (1993), Kemper and Simpson (1998) identify that 
features such as history, and social capital (networks, norms, values) play an 
important role in how reforms are accepted and driven. In north Australia, Straton et 
al. (2006) found that norms and information flow are important influences on the 
function of water markets.  
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Table 1: Conditions for an effective market 
 
 
 
Using Kemper and Simpson’s (1998) framework and applying it to Australia’s water 
reforms in the north Australian context, two key questions arise: (1) What institutional 
arrangements need to be in place to make water markets work; and (2) How and 
whether institutional arrangements to support water markets can be adapted to local 
conditions, as well as the existing policy and institutional setting? In addition to these 
considerations, attention must be given to the scarcity of water. Unless a commodity 
is scarce then the capacity for trading is limited— in considering the development of 
markets in northern Australia the present situation highlights that currently trade in 
water is limited in size (NWC, 2008) and the resource is generally unallocated or 
under-allocated (Pigram, 2006).  Understanding how markets could work or develop 
in this context has yet to be explored in the literature.  
 
Conditions 
for an 
effective 
market 
Australia (MDB) International 
• Tradable with limited 
constraints; level playing 
field and minimal 
transaction costs; diverse 
range of water products 
offered to all participants; 
no third party impacts 
(NWC, 2009).  
• Specified right to water, 
clear rules, accurate publicly 
available information, 
competent administration, 
relatively low transaction 
costs and a publicly 
accepted market.  
Competition among users 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2006). 
• Turral et al. (2005) 
underscore the importance 
of effective institutional 
arrangements such as 
specified water entitlements, 
and rigorous water 
allocation and water 
accounting procedures.   
• Perfect knowledge 
available for all players, 
competitive market, no 
externalities, minimal 
cost enforcement and cost 
efficient water 
infrastructure (Stoeckl et 
al., 2008). 
• Specified and tradable water rights, 
an effective register and 
administrative system reliable 
infrastructure, a common water 
accounting system (Kemper, 2001)  
• Property right, trading exchange, 
available information, administration 
and enforcement agency, reliable 
infrastructure, accurate accounting 
and reporting of use (Kemper and 
Simpson, 1998). 
• Flexibility, security, an opportunity 
cost, certainty, equity and fairness, 
reflects public values (Howe, 
Schurmeier and Shaw Jr., 1986). 
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Barriers to establishing and operating water markets  
 
Despite a focus on water reform across Australia since COAG 1994, markets, 
planning and policy generally remain at a formative stage (Stoeckl and Abrahams, 
2007). The NWC highlighted that the level of science informing water planning 
across Australia “remains a concern” (NWC, 2007: 7). Grafton and Peterson (2007) 
identify that there is a common need to understand flow regime required to achieve 
desired ecological outcomes— as well there is a lack of knowledge around water 
pricing, transaction costs and the social impacts of trading— these are knowledge 
gaps which may impact the efficacy of markets. Stoeckl and Abrahams (2007: 3) 
argue that “gaps in knowledge remain, particularly regarding groundwater, 
environmental and ecological needs, and deficiencies in measurement, accounting, 
metering and reporting” These knowledge deficiencies all have the effect of 
enhancing risk (particularly to the environment) and reducing the accuracy of 
monitoring regimes.  The NWC (2007) underscores that a shortage of skilled water 
resource practitioners in Australia acts to hinder the progress of the NWI’s water 
reform agenda (which markets is an important component). Stoeckl et al. (2006) argue 
that a constraint on water trading is restrictions on inter-basin transfers, which is 
where the most benefit can be obtained when water can be distributed to where supply 
conditions are constrained. In the MDB the NWC (2009) identifies trades out of 
district as a limitation. While across Australia they argue that the following barriers be 
removed and includes: that the unbundling of land and water be progressed to 
enhance reform, that consistent reporting be adopted across jurisdictions to encourage 
trading, and more information on third party impacts be employed.  
 
Barriers General (MDB) Northern Australia 
• Poor understanding of environmental 
flow regime, pricing, transaction costs 
and social impacts (Grafton and 
Peterson, 2007). 
• Human resource issues (NWC, 2007). 
• Trades out of district, unbundled land 
and water, inconsistent reporting 
standards, limited information on third 
party impacts (NWC, 2009). 
• Knowledge gaps, poor metering, 
accounting and reporting standards 
(Stoeckl and Abrahams, 2007). 
• Challenges for inter-basin transfers 
(Stoeckl et al. 2006). 
• Uncertainty with supply, limited 
infrastructure, culture, limited flexibility 
in institutional arrangements, interaction 
with financial institutions, administrative 
issues and structural adjustment for 
communities (Bjornlund, 2004). 
• Limited understanding of resource, 
uncertainty on effect of extraction 
on social and ecological values 
(Stoeckl et al., 2006; Straton et 
al., 2006). 
 
Table 2: Barriers to establishment or effective operation of markets 
 
In examining constraints in the MDB, Bjornlund (2004) identified impediments to 
water markets through workshops and focus groups with stakeholders. These 
impediments included doubts about future water supply, physical infrastructure 
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constraints, and restrictions on trades out of irrigation districts—stakeholders also 
described tradition and culture among irrigators as being a limitation to markets, as 
well as the limited flexibility and security in property rights across jurisdictions and 
financial institutions requiring individuals to hold entitlements—other constraints 
included administrative issues and adjustment pressures in communities (Bjornlund, 
2004). In a north Australian context, systems are generally not well understood and 
there is little consumptive use—while markets may exist in specific regions there is 
little trading (in contrast to the MDB). Water availability in northern Australia is 
episodic unlike the perennial rivers in south Eastern Australia, there is often a reliance 
on aquifers, and the impacts of extraction are little understood. The lack of knowledge 
on the characteristics of water resources in northern Australia could potentially have 
significant social and ecological impacts if water is allocated to consumptive uses 
without in depth analysis of its effect (Stoeckl et al., 2006; Straton et al., 2006). 
Straton et al. (2006) also view labour constraints as a limitation on the business 
models for water dependent industries in the north.  
2.2 Drivers for Change in North Australia 
 
Pigram makes the observation that the: “Development of the water resources of the 
tropical north has always held a strong fascination for many Australians” (Pigram, 
2006: 50). Pigram goes on to describe that Queensland has approximately 45% of 
surface water run-off in Australia, but that this is largely confined to drainage 
divisions in the tropical north, which is largely undeveloped (Pigram, 2006). In other 
jurisdictions in the north, there is a similar situation in the tropical belt of the NT 
which has highly seasonal surface run-off, and northern Western Australia which also 
has a significant component (albeit seasonal) of water resources in the state which are 
largely undeveloped outside the Ord River irrigation project (which is expanding).  
The relative abundance of water in the north has sustained an idea that there is 
potential for irrigation development in parts of northern Australia. 1
 
  
There are various research initiatives to create frameworks to explore the 
development potential of northern Australia—these are funded through the 
Commonwealth Government which has established an Office of Northern Australia, 
and includes the Northern Australian Land and Water Taskforce, Northern Australian 
Irrigation Futures (which identified the potential for an irrigation mosaic model) and 
Northern Australia Water Futures Assessment (the first part is the Northern Australia 
Sustainable Yields Project). There is also the environmental research hub Tropical 
Rivers and Coastal Knowledge (TRaCK) which is exploring the biological, ecological 
and physical attributes of northern Australia’s freshwater resources.   
2.3 Institutional Arrangements in Northern Australia 
 
The study region for this project encompasses a vast and diverse geographic area, from 
Cairns in the east to the Kimberley in the west. Stoeckl et al. (2006) and Hegarty, Kellett 
and Bristow (2005) identify the complex array of institutions, regulation and legislation 
that interact around water in a north Australian context—not only does this include 
                                                 
1  An Australian Broadcasting Commission news report title underscores this, “Farmers told to move 
north ‘where water is’” underscores a sentiment that opportunities exist in irrigation across northern 
Australia given water supply constraints in south eastern Australia (Barker, 2006). 
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legislation within jurisdictions but Commonwealth legislation.  Each State and Territory 
has assigned ownership of water to the Crown, and the jurisdictions have developed their 
own unique institutional, legal and policy settings to meet local conditions. As a result of 
this institutional diversity there is different terminology between the jurisdictions. For 
example, Queensland uses supplemented to describe whether there exists water 
infrastructure to store and/or distribute water to users and unsupplemented where users 
self supply (while NWI terminology and that used in NT and WA is 
regulated/unregulated).  A summary of the different institutional frameworks for water, 
and for water trading in jurisdictions is provided in Table 3.  Table 4 provides a review of 
water plans (that allow for trading) and identifies how robust these institutional 
arrangements are. 
Commonwealth 
 
Each State and Territory is vested with control over water sharing, although the 
Commonwealth has utilised its various constitutional powers to effect change within 
States over time, and in the NT the Commonwealth has significant power under 
section 122 of the Commonwealth Constitution to legislate. The Commonwealth 
plays an important role in driving water reform and is a crucial part of the institutional 
framework of northern Australia.  
 
The key institutions in relation to water at a Commonwealth level are the Department 
of Environment, Water Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA) and the NWC. The National 
Water Commission Act (2004) enables the NWC to carry out its functions furthering 
the NWI. The Water Act (2007) (CTH) provides for Commonwealth control over the 
MDB, it also augments the NWI in areas such as best practice pricing and record 
keeping. Amendments to the Water Act in 2008 provided the Bureau of Meteorology 
with expanded powers under the Meteorology Act (1955) to set a national standard 
for water information, collect and publish information on water, and develop a 
National Water Account that shall detail water supply and use across the nation 
(DEWHA, 2007).  Other important Acts and Regulation that have an impact on the 
management of water resources in States and Territories include: 
• Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) which 
provides for protection of areas of national ecological significance, and areas 
designated under World Heritage or RAMSAR listing. 
• Native Title Act (1993) which sets out the process for Indigenous Australians 
to get recognition of various rights (e.g. customary rights) they may possess to 
unencumbered land. Importantly, section 211 of the Act provides for the 
protection of native title rights, such as those to hunt and fish, and may be 
relevant to decision making for water resources in each jurisdiction. 
 
 
Table 3: Institutional, legislative and policy framework for water Trading in QLD, NT and WA 
 
 (Adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers Report 2006) 
 
 
 NT QLD WA 
Water Legislation 
 
Water Act (1992) (amended 2004) Water Act (2000) Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 
(1914) 
Legislation to support water 
trading 
- Intra-state/territory 
- Interstate 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
Regulatory Planning Processes 
prior to trade 
Water Allocation Plan in a Water Control 
District- where trade is allowed 
Water Resources Plan which is applied in 
the Resources Operation Plan, where trade is 
allowed 
Regional Plan which is applied locally 
in Water Allocation Management Plan – 
trade only within Water Resource 
Management Unit (WRMU) 
Trading permitted in 
regulated/supplemented and 
unregulated/unsupplumented 
schemes 
 
Regulated 
 
Supplemented and Unsupplumented 
 
Regulated  (generally within Co-
operatives) 
Entitlement to water separate to 
land 
X   
Where there is a Resources Operation Plan 
x 
Surface Water Access 
Entitlement/Allocation 
Specification 
Water license: required for any water 
extracted other than for rural stock and 
domestic 
 
Water allocation: volumetric limit for 
licenses expressed annually or monthly 
Water license: allows one to extract water 
but comes attached with land 
 
Water allocation: an annual share of the 
resource not bundled with land  
 
Interim water allocation: enables user to 
extract water before ROP completed 
Water license: necessary to extract water 
unless for rural stock and domestic use 
License required for consumptive 
(commercial) use 
      
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Table 3: Institutional, Legislative and Policy Framework for Water Trading in QLD, NT and WA (cont) 
 
 (Adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers Report 2006) 
 
 
 NT QLD WA 
Delivery right separate from 
resource share component in 
legislation 
X X x 
Allocations metered       
 
Types of 
Entitlements/Licenses that 
cannot be traded 
Groundwater trade is confined to 
Water Control District and there 
can be no upstream trade unless no 
harm can be proven 
Stock and Domestic Stock and Domestic; entitlements that are 
purely speculative; entitlements without 
clearly specified volumes; and water for In 
situ vales (Ecological Water Requirements 
and Return Flow) 
Requirement of interest in 
land to access 
entitlement/allocation  
 
  
Application for license requires 
assessment of land use activity 
proposed and projected water 
needs (compared to industry 
standard in area) 
 
x 
 
 
  
Require an ability to access land to apply 
water to, either through freehold title or 
lease agreement, 
Types of permanent trades May trade whole or part of 
entitlement provided in license 
(but whole can only be temporary) 
May trade water allocation or under certain 
circumstances transfer interim water allocations to 
another landholding and in certain areas specified in 
Water Regulation  (2 areas in the State) 
May trade whole or part of entitlement 
provided in license (but whole is only 
through land sale) 
Types of temporary trades May trade whole or part of 
entitlement provided in license 
Seasonal Water Assignments are a one-off assignment 
of a specified volume of water for the remainder of 
the water year. Leases are similar to leases of land i.e. 
they transfer all the benefits and responsibilities of the 
entitlement for the period. 
May trade whole or part of entitlement but 
cannot on trade to a third party 
Minimum period for 
temporary transfer 
N/A as no trades No minimum requirement A 1 year assignment 
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Table 3:  Institutional, Legislative and Policy Framework for Water Trading in QLD, NT and WA (cont) 
 
 NT QLD WA 
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(Adapted from PricewaterhouseCoopers Report 2006) 
Government approval of 
trade required 
  
 
  
For unsupplemented yes. In supplemented only for 
permanent trade. Sunwater has online exchange for 
temporary trade. 
  
Must apply for transfer of license and allocation 
Intrastate trading  
- permitted 
- occurred  
  
                     x 
Trade only within Water Control 
Districts 
  
  
  
Seasonal water assignment trade and permanent only 
within ROP areas. 
  
  
Trade only with Water Resource Management 
Unit. Though water transfer is common.  
Interstate trading 
- permitted 
- occurred  
  
 X 
  
  
(Yes seasonal cross border trade has occurred in south) 
  
 x 
(Although possible no process to do this in 
place) 
Fees, Charges and Taxes N/A                                  x 
Statutory Authority to 
storage and distribution 
water  
  
Power and Water has right to storage 
and distribution in urban areas. 
  
Sunwater has storage license and distributes water in 
supplemented schemes- it has a contract with licensees 
to provide water. 
 
  
Water Corporation, a government owned 
corporation has right to storage and releases 
water to Co-operatives. 
Co-operatives in Irrigation 
Areas/Districts 
X X   
National Compatible 
Register 
X 
But part of NWMS 
  
 
x 
But NICWER and NWMS participation. 
Water Accounting       
 
Indigenous Reserve 
In Katherine, 2% of the resource 
available to successful native title 
holder group. 
 In Cape York Heritage Area Wild Rivers and Cultural 
or Commercial Licenses available for 10 ML per year in 
Gulf and Mitchell 
Currently assessing policy options in La Grange 
aquifer draft plan. 
 
Legislation proscribing 
water trading 
X X 
Wild Rivers Act 2005 prescribes low impact 
development in high preservation zones.  
x 
2.3.1 Robust design applied to water plans 
Water planning sets the platform for trade in jurisdictions across northern Australia. The NWI 
states that surface water and groundwater plans should be adaptive to address environmental 
and other public benefit outcomes (clause 25). Schedule E4 of the NWI provides that plans 
should be capable of adapting and integrating change. Clause 40 of the NWI underscores the 
importance of a monitoring and review program to support plans. It has been identified that 
the direction and outcomes of plans should be supported in legislation and state-wide policy, 
to increase consistency there should be strategies to meet these objectives. Table 4 provides 
an overview of plans in the tropical belt of northern Australia, how robust they are, and any 
adaptive measures employed around water sharing and allocation. 
Water 
Allocation Plans 
in North 
NT (WAP) QLD (WRP and ROP ) WA (Regional Plans and 
Water Management Plan’s 
(WMP))  
Completed Tindall (2009) Gulf  WRP (2007) 
Mitchell WRP (2007) 
Ord River WMP (2006) 
Draft Oollo 
Mataranka  
Gulf ROP 
Mitchell ROP 
 
La Grange 
Duration of 
Plan 
10 years 10 years  3 years 
Plan Review < 5 years < 10 years (WRP’s) 7 years 
Statutory Plan Yes, the water 
allocation plan is 
statutory. 
Yes, the WRP is 
statutory.  
No. But the proposed Water 
Resources Management Bill 
provides for statutory plans. 
Adaptive 
measures 
Yes, the plan may be 
amended any time 
without 
compensation. Also 
the risk assignment 
framework with 
statutory power to 
reduce allocation to 
zero (and impose 
restrictions on stock 
and domestic) 
provides flexibility 
each year.  
Yes, there is a risk 
assignment framework 
in supplemented 
schemes to reduce 
entitlements. The ROP 
may be amended at any 
time or replaced by the 
Minister. The WRP, if 
replaced within first 10 
years allows for 
entitlement holders to be 
paid reasonable 
compensation if the 
change reduces the 
value of the entitlement. 
Annual reports assess 
performance in meeting 
specific outcomes in 
plans (ss. 54-56).  
There is a statutory process to 
reduce allocation if there is 
impact on the environment or to 
respond to changing conditions. 
The Ord plan can be amended, 
revoked, replaced according to 
statute.  
 
 
Table 4: Plans in the tropical belt of northern Australia
2.3.2 Northern Territory 
 
Institutional Arrangements  
 
The protection of natural and cultural values is an important aim in managing the 
NT’s water resources (Northern Territory Government, 2009). The Water Act (1992) 
(amended 2004) provides the legislative underpinning for water trading, as well as the 
power to manage and allocate water in the NT (see Diagram 1 for the institutional and 
regulatory framework for water allocation in the Northern Territory). The Water Act 
sets the rules for licensing of groundwater and surface water extraction, as well as 
provides for the maintenance of a register of entitlements. The Department of Natural 
Resources, Environment, the Arts and Sport (NRETAS) is responsible for 
administering the Water Act, and a Controller of Water Resources advises and reports 
to the responsible Minister, and issues, transfers and amends licenses. Trading can 
only occur within a Water Control District which is declared by a Minister when there 
is sufficient need to do so (i.e. reaching full allocation). Currently, in the NT there are 
six Water Control Districts and there are three finalised Water Allocation Plans, 
which sets the general trading rules in Water Control Districts. There is one plan in 
place in the study region, for the Tindall aquifer in Katherine, and there are also draft 
water plans to be prepared for the Oolloo aquifer and Mataranka region.  
 
In 2007-8 there was 494,000 ML of licenses in the NT, with no trade (NWC, 2008). A 
license enables the holder to draw surface or groundwater subject to the terms of the 
license, and where an allocation plan exists the license holder must abide by this 
allocation plan. Only water allocated for “consumptive beneficial use” may be traded, 
there cannot be trades between non consumptive (cultural and ecological water) water 
and consumptive (commercial) water. In addition to the requirement that trade can 
only occur within Water Control Districts, two additional constraints on trading 
include: (1) no upstream trade unless it is proven to have no impact on the provisions 
of an allocation plan, and (2) only ‘within-aquifer’ trading is permitted.  
 
Straton et al. (2006) identified in interviews with horticulturists in the Katherine 
region of the NT that there was a negative perception of water markets, particularly 
the function of systems in southern Australia and its application to the northern 
context. However, Straton et al. (2006) also found that horticulturists are in favour of 
security of entitlement tenure, more efficient administrative regimes and more 
scientific understanding to guide planning. Straton et al. (2006) also found that 
informal norms and values (i.e. social connections) have an impact on the formal 
institutional framework—it is also argued  that the level of information available to 
users will impacts water trading.  The authors call for increased participation of 
communities in water resource management and planning (Straton et al., 2006) — this 
approach reflects that highlighted in the NWI. 
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Figure 1: Institutional and regulatory framework for water trading in the Northern Territory 
 
                             
 
Sourced from National Water Commission, 2008, Australian Water Markets Report 2007/8 
2.3.3 Queensland 
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
Queensland has significant water resources in the north primarily in unsupplemented or 
unregulated systems, but has limited water resources in South East Queensland where a 
majority of the population resides (Pigram, 2006).  The Water Act (2000) governs the 
management of Queensland’s water resources and establishes a water planning, water 
sharing and water trading framework.  
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There are three types of trade available in Queensland:  
(1) a permanent trade of water allocation and a permanent transfer of an interim water 
allocation (which can only occur in specified areas and before a Resource 
Operations Plan commences, with the entitlement generally reattaching to land), 
and 
(2) a lease of a water allocation and, 
(3) a seasonal water assignment (a temporary trade).  
 
The Water Regulations 2002 set in place the procedural requirements and fees for trade. 
The Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM) functions to 
support and administer: water planning and water sharing, as well as water allocations 
and the water licensing and entitlement regime. DERM also administers resource 
operations licenses (for Sunwater to operate infrastructure such as storages and channels 
in supplemented schemes) and distribution operations licenses. DERM also administers 
permanent water trades as well as provides approvals to seasonal water assignments in 
unsupplemented systems.  
 
Sunwater, a government owned corporation, approves seasonal assignments of water in 
supplemented systems (for which it has an operations license and manages water storage 
and distribution infrastructure) and it has in place an online trading mechanism to 
facilitate these arrangements. It must also follow a trading code of conduct. Trade in 
unsupplemented areas (like in much of northern Australia) requires DERM approval.  
 
DERM, at the direction of its Minister and Chief Executive Officer, has in place a two-
tiered planning framework to manage water. The first stage of planning is the Water 
Resources Plan (WRP), which sets the water planning and sharing parameters of a 
catchment, identifying the volume of water resources available in the catchment— during 
the WRP process DERM undertakes flow modelling and determines the water to be 
shared between consumptive and non consumptive uses. These WRP’s are statutory plans 
and are reviewed after 10 years. If they are changed within the 10 years after the WRP is 
approved then a water allocation holder is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation 
by the State if a change reduces the value of the allocation. The ROP also facilitates 
trade in the catchment by converting existing water licenses and interim water allocations 
to tradeable water allocations, separating this water allocation from land title, granting a 
resource operations license, as well as establishing trading rules to support sustainable use 
and avoid impacts on third parties. Each year an allocation for entitlements in 
supplemented schemes is set according to a water sharing index which is the mean of the 
percentage of number of months in the simulation period (a historic period) for each 
priority group (high to low security) that allocations are fully supplied.  
 
Water entitlements that are converted under the ROP are recorded on a functioning 
register, the Water Allocations Register (based on the Land Register). This register 
records details such as the holder/s of the water allocation, tenancy arrangements, 
location, purpose, conditions and nominal volume.  For supplemented water allocations it 
will also record the relevant resource operations licence and the priority group. For 
unsupplemented allocations it also details the water management area, extraction rate, 
flow conditions, volumetric limit and water allocation group. It is also possible to 
register encumbrances and interests such as mortgages and administrative advices such as 
settlement notices (DERM, 2009). For a trade to take effect it must be registered. The 
Registrar of Water Allocations also functions as the Registrar of Land Titles, in the 
Registrar of Titles and Water Allocations in DERM (DERM, 2009). Only trade that 
modifies the attributes of an allocation require DERM approval. 
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In 2007-8 there were 3.567 GL of water entitlements issued in Queensland, with 75, 968 
ML of trade (with a value of $57.7 M) of which 44.5% was part of a property sale (NWC, 
2008). Little of this occurred in the study region. Queensland has more water storages 
than its counterparts in northern Australia. There are two WRP’s in the study region: that 
being the Gulf and Mitchell WRP’s, both completed in 2007— the ROP’s for these 
WRP’s are still at a draft stage.  
 
Constraints 
 
Some constraints identified on water trade in Queensland include: the requirement of 
approvals for a change in location of water extraction, the restriction on trade between 
supplemented schemes (NWC, 2008) and lack of support among users for online trading 
within supplemented schemes (Queensland Farmers Federation, 2008).    
 
Figure 2: Institutional and regulatory framework for water trading in Queensland 
 
 
Sourced from National Water Commission, 2008, Australian Water Markets Report 2007/8 
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2.3.4 Western Australia 
 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
WA was the last State to sign on to the NWI in April 2006. The Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act (1914) (RIWI Act) provides the framework for water governance in the 
State, regulating and managing its use, as well as supporting its protection (see Diagram 3 
for a diagram of the institutional and regulatory framework for water trading in WA). The 
Rights in Water and Regulations 2000 (WA) supports this Act. A state-wide policy No. 6 
provides for trade of water entitlements, there are also state-wide policies to support 
environmental objectives and water sharing. Before trade can occur the seller must hold a 
valid, tradable license. To be eligible for a license, persons must have access to land. 
There are two forms of trade available in the state: 
 
(1) Part or whole of the license in a permanent transfer (whole permanent transfer can 
only occur through a land sale); and 
(2) Temporary transfer 
 
Only volumetric licenses can be traded in whole or in part to another eligible party (i.e. 
someone else who has access to land). The Department of Water is responsible for 
administering the RIWI Act, and provides approvals (or refusals) to trade, which must 
occur within water resource management units (WRMU) (which is basically within a 
specific basin or aquifer). There are 45 groundwater and 51 surface water management 
areas in the state (NWC, 2008). In 2007-8 there were 2.515 GL of water licenses issued in 
WA, with trade of 486 ML mostly concentrated in the south west of the state (with a 
value of about $1 M), and 57 % of water trade was associated with a property sale (NWC, 
2008). A Water Licensing database forms the license register and records all permanent 
and temporary trade. Irrigation Co-operatives that hold bulk water licenses and their 
members access their entitlements through the Co-operative. All trades are registered 
through the National Irrigation Co-operative Water Entitlement Register (NICWER).  
 
Western Australia has embarked on a water reform program, a result of the NWI and 
state-driven review. The reform agenda involves a consolidation of 11 separate pieces of 
water related legislation, including the RIWI Act into two pieces of legislation– these are 
currently the Water Services Bill and the Water Resources Management Bill. The 
unbundling of land and water title is provided for in these new Bills.  There is a three tier 
planning framework at a State, Regional and local area Management Plan (allocation 
plan) level. In the north, a Kimberley-wide Regional Plan is being developed that is a 
strategy document which sets the broad parameters of development and water use in the 
region.  The Ord River Surface Water plan is the only operational plan in the study 
region.  A draft La Grange aquifer management plan has been developed with a 50 GL 
cap set on extraction.  
 
Water trading has occurred in the south west of WA. On the Ord River, a two-tiered 
trading structure exists within the local Co-operative that provides a volumetric allocation 
based on irrigated area (in hectares) in the scheme—at the time of data collection there 
had been no trading in the Ord. There is a 95% reliability provided to irrigators in the Ord 
(meaning irrigators can access their full allocation 95 years out of 100). For Ord Stage 1 
(16,000 ha in total) there is an entitlement to 17 ML of water for 1 hectare of land. 
 30 
Funding for Stage 2 has been approved that will provide for another 16,000 ha of land 
under irrigation in the scheme.  
 
Constraints 
 
The NWC (2008) found that markets are not deep or well developed in Western Australia, 
and identified institutional and legislative constraints to trade. Trades must occur within a 
WRMU, but there are examples of transfers. The Department of Water may refuse to 
allow a trade if it is inconsistent with policy, or to protect the environment, prevent 
inefficient use, or to encourage a fair market.  
 
Figure 3: Institutional and regulatory framework for water trading in Western Australia 
 
 
 
 
Sourced from National Water Commission, 2008, Australian Water Markets Report 2007/8 
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3. Project Methodology 
 
Interview questions (see Appendix 2) for this study were developed to provide an open-
ended discussion with interviewees. The aim of the interviews was to: (1) Discuss the 
development and progress of institutional arrangements for supporting water markets, 
with a focus on the tropical belt in northern Australia; and (2) Identify constraints to the 
establishment of water markets in the context of the north. 
 
The respondents were key decision makers, policy makers and opinion leaders. The 
qualitative nature of the study was designed to provide rich understanding of context, as 
well as to articulate meanings, values, experiences and views of these diverse opinion 
leaders, policy makers and experts (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). Contacts were provided 
by research partners and a ‘snowball method’ was employed with interviewees (where 
interviewees provide introductions to potential interviewees). Data collection ceased once 
no new names or data emerged (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
3.1 Data Collection 
 
Structured interview questions were developed in collaboration with NAILSMA and 
these questions were pre-tested with interviewees. The protocol used included: 
 
(1) Initial contact was made, either through introductory email or through telephone 
contact with interviewees (identified by research partners);  
(2) Consent forms information sheets and questions were sent by email prior to 
meeting with interviewees; and 
(3) For those interviewees who agreed to be interviewed, a time and location was 
arranged for the interview. 
 
The ethical protocol set out for this project and approved by the Australian National 
University’s Human Research Ethics Committee guided data collection. It was 
emphasised that participation was as voluntary and input could be withdrawn at any time. 
In total 28 representatives from relevant State/Territory and Commonwealth government 
departments were interviewed, and a further 14 people were interviewed from land 
councils, as well as experts in the field. Field work was conducted in Kununurra, Perth, 
Broome, Darwin, Canberra, Brisbane and Cairns (see Appendix 3 for a list of 
interviewees, dates and locations of interviews). Most of the interviews were audio 
recorded face-to-face interviews at the office of interviewees. Seven interviews were 
conducted by telephone because of incompatible schedules.  
 
Transcripts were recorded from audio or handwritten notes as soon as interviews were 
completed. These transcripts were sent back to interviewees for their confirmation. In 
some cases transcripts were amended or points clarified. The confirmed interview data 
was then compiled into a database and results were compared among interviewees to 
identify any patterns or differences in responses.  Tentative findings were discerned from 
data then sent out to interviewees, to be proven or disproven. Conclusive findings were 
developed after this stage and the final version of the report prepared. 
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3.2 Analysis 
 
Transcripts of each interview were entered into a database and the data was organised 
according to each question. The answers to questions were compared within and across 
the various jurisdictions. Patterns were identified and themes generated for each question. 
These findings were compared to existing literature, media and other documents, 
‘triangulating’ data sources to provide greater reliability in findings (Jick, 1979). 
Tentative findings were sent out to interviewees to clarify emerging issues, and then 
finally compared to the literature, increasing validity, reliability and credibility of findings 
(Auberbach and Silverstein, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994). More conclusive findings 
were generated after careful consideration of feedback from interviewees. Thus, data 
analysis involved data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification 
(Auberbach and Silverstein, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
4. Analysis of Institutional Arrangements, Important Features 
and Constraints to Establishing Water Markets 
 
Based on the responses of 42 interviewees, this section provides an analysis of the 
institutional arrangements for supporting water markets in each jurisdiction in northern 
Australia.   
4.1 Institutional Arrangements 
 
This section presents findings from interviewees in each State/Territory, as well as the 
perspectives of interviewees from the Commonwealth Government. A review is 
undertaken of the property right to water, the institutional arrangements in each 
jurisdiction to support water trading, as well as the approaches and strategies, if any, to 
meet commitments under the NWI (with focus on northern Australia).  
4.1.1 Commonwealth 
 
How useful water markets would be to the conditions present in a north Australian 
context was contested by interviewees. However, it was emphasised by a number of 
interviewees in the Commonwealth that it is not the market by itself that will produce 
positive outcomes but the entire water management system outlined in the NWI. 
 
"…Don’t get hooked up on [the] special features of [the] Top End. I know 
there is the land and the water. But you have to approach it as ‘what do you 
need for a market’? And that is clear water planning rules, an efficient 
register, and then you stand back… Doing the water management rules is 
good for sustainability even aside from your market. The water register system 
working well is a pre-requisite to an efficient market but its not the market, 
and by establishing a register you wont have a market overnight, [but] you 
will have the means for a better market…Metering is critical… Chris Guest, 
DEWHA 
 
The prevailing perspective among interviewees in the Commonwealth is that the needs of 
a water market are the same anywhere, regardless of features. The conditions present in 
northern Australia such as lack of competition for the resource, episodic flow regimes, 
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and high variability do not preclude the tropical belt from adopting market based 
mechanisms for water allocation.  It was emphasised by interviewees that for an effective 
water market in the north, alongside sufficient demand, the following elements are 
required:  
 
(1) The creation of an exclusive property right (unbundling land and water title); 
(2) A rigorous planning framework; 
(3) A functioning water register; 
(4) A common water accounting system; and  
(5) Adequate water metering.  
 
These conditions tend to reflect the focus of the NWI and the conditions for an effective 
market in literature in a domestic and international context. The general view among 
interviewees was that the transition towards implementing trading arrangements may be 
complex, and require a significant investment of time and resources (which may not 
necessarily be cost effective across the region). There also may be a variety of constraints 
to the establishment of water markets and there may be no incentive or need for water 
markets in many catchments where water is not scarce and other approaches for allocating 
water may be preferred—these approaches included some of the non market methods 
currently used in the jurisdictions.  
 
Several interviewees from the Commonwealth argued that there is a sequence to the 
development of institutional arrangements suitable for effective water markets. In 
jurisdictions, such as the NT, where the cost-benefit ratio to implement all aspects of the 
institutional arrangements for water trading may not be favourable—but it was argued 
that certain elements, such as statutory water planning, metering and accounting may be 
introduced to support improved outcomes in water management. It was discussed in 
interviews that COAG has supported and driven the development of a National Water 
Marketing System (NWMS), for which all States and Territories are involved 
(Queensland and Victoria already have suitable water registers that do not need redesign –
however, these states are involved in the NWMS for initiatives such as the development 
of a National Portal and interoperability). The NWMS will aim to develop a common 
register system across jurisdictions. It will record entitlements, the ownership details of 
the entitlement, as well as particulars of any trade in the entitlement designed to improve 
information available to buyers and sellers—to create a confidence in trading regimes.  
 
A water policy specialist raised an important issue in an interview, arguing that before 
moving towards water markets there needs to be some process of dealing with the legal 
rights of stakeholders. This point is particularly important in a north Australian context 
with the prominence of Indigenous interests. These interests have grounding in both 
statutory and common law and should be addressed if they are to be infringed in any way. 
Given that there are subsistence and customary rights provided for and protected under 
the Native Title Act 1993, any trading regime may need to be adapted to the conditions 
present in each region and seek to accommodate these rights. Several interviewees 
emphasised that there are sets of issues in the north which will inevitably be resolved in 
the courts before being considered by policy (the example provided was Indigenous 
issues like the Blue Mud Bay case, or the rights of commercial fisherman/prawn 
trawlers).  
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A number of interviewees reflected that decision makers may need to think innovatively 
in the north to determine how and when a market may be appropriate to introduce into a 
catchment. An interviewee describes the north Australian context and a potential way 
forward given the conditions present:  
 
"For the development of markets one of the theories is that you need a cap. 
Why would you buy a right when you can apply for one and get it cheaper? 
There is still a frontier mentality to water in northern Australia. Before 
trading you have to deal with the broad allocation of rights first, then look at 
fishing rights, then impose a limit on how much can be used in irrigation. You 
need some creative thinking about the framework and lay out options. There 
would need to be some trigger points in the framework for when trading 
occurs."  Water Policy Specialist, Canberra 
 
It was identified in interviews that as governments recognise the importance of markets 
and they become more relevant to the north, decision makers will need to weigh up the 
costs and benefits (including social impacts) to a trading framework on a case by case 
basis. Creating flexibility (such as through a risk sharing framework) in markets to adapt 
to changing climatic and supply scenarios was also viewed as important, informed by 
experience in the MDB.  
4.1.2 Northern Territory 
 
“The real emphasis of the NWI has been on transparency and information-- 
it’s a prerequisite of markets. The NT has developed legislation which creates 
registers and licenses. The NT Water Act says you can have markets but 
doesn’t establish the rules...Spatial constraints on trade would result in small 
markets and that probably wouldn’t work, as there wouldn’t be enough sellers 
and buyers. The key concern is not to stuff up tropical rivers. There is a fear of 
getting it wrong. To sum up attitudes to water markets, I would say that the 
government is willing but worried." Peter Whitehead, Senior Policy Officer, 
NRETAS 
 
Several respondents stated that the general approach to introducing a water trading 
framework in the NT was, and should be, precautionary. There are no internal metrics for 
water reform in the NT apart from those indicators assessed by the NWC in its national 
water market reports. The focus in the NT has been on planning and the NT is part of the 
National Water Marketing System (NWMS) to develop a register that is compatible with 
other jurisdictions across Australia.  This section provides further detail on the approach 
to achieving commitments under the NWI. 
 
a description of existing property rights in water 
 
A water licensing regime exists in the NT, where landholders apply to NRETAS for an 
allocation of water for a projected use (which is compared against industry standards). 
The potential to trade exists in the NT under the Water Act. The ability to trade occurs 
within Water Control Districts and trading rules are contained in Water Allocation Plans.  
However, there have been no trades as yet.  
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The general approach to implementing a water reform agenda in the NT can be described 
by Ian Lancaster, Controller of Water Resources NRETAS (NT): 
 
"The rules are restrictive for trading, the community wants this.  The 
community doesn’t want water to be treated like the stock-market. They want 
water to be used for agriculture and horticulture, for regional development. 
These rules have been developed in a completely transparent manner. Given 
the immaturity of the market and industry, we are taking a precautionary 
approach...Unless you can show me a land use, a plan and realistic volume 
then you cannot get a licence to access water."  
 
Therefore, the pace of reform and the approach to trading in the NT is shaped by 
community opinion. Interviewees emphasised that they did not want to see a repeat of the 
MDB in the NT and a precautionary approach to implementing reform has been adopted. 
Interviewees reflected that communities want to see water supporting regional economic 
development outcomes and not being purchased for speculative use.  
 
existing and proposed means/strategies for complying with the NWI provisions  
 
Reform in the NT has been focused on developing water plans and on setting 
conservative limits for consumptive pools. Interviewees emphasised that the concept of a 
water market is only at its infancy in the NT and that there is still much more work to be 
undertaken to enhance understanding the characteristics of water resources. A 
precautionary approach is adopted in identifying limits to consumptive pools because of 
knowledge gaps, and to also reflect community values which interviewees described as 
sceptical views towards water trading. An 80/20 guideline is employed which provides a 
cap of 20% on water resources for consumptive use and 80% set aside for ecological and 
cultural flows. Ian Lancaster, Controller of Water Resources, NT discussed the 80/20 
guideline, as well as the interaction of Indigenous interests which are prominent in land 
tenure: 
 
“For the 80/20 guidelines, 80% is set aside for environmental and cultural 
purposes. Indigenous people don’t want to be just lumped in with the 
environment. They want to be included in the consumptive pool. It’s a non 
issue. We can provide an Indigenous reserve out of the 20%. We could keep 
Indigenous x% set aside, if an when Indigenous people want to get involved in 
enterprise. They could develop a plan and could apply for X megalitres. We 
want to ensure that Indigenous people aren’t locked out of the water 
allocation process. Can Indigenous people trade it? I would be concerned if 
they could permanently trade, however I see no reason why temporary trading 
couldn’t be undertaken. I would take advice from the Indigenous Water Policy 
Group. Any funds gained could be poured into Indigenous economic 
development. If you can get $100 per megalitre for 500 megalitres then do it 
for 5 years [and] that would allow the development of indigenous enterprise.”  
 
Interviewees identified that the 80/20 guidelines may offer challenges for groundwater 
where uncertainty about the size of aquifers requires almost a case-by-case assessment in 
developing caps. Some interviewees offered that without understanding recharge, 
interaction with surface water and the impact of extraction during the dry, there is 
increased potential for negative outcomes. However, interviewees from the NT argued 
that the 80/20 rule is strictly a guideline and because most catchments are under-allocated 
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there is room to adjust extraction limits as required. Also, understanding the scope of 
cultural and ecological rights, which are gradually being viewed as distinct, requires 
appropriate investigation to minimise third party impacts. The development of community 
advisory groups such as the Daly River Management Advisory Committee, which has a 
traditional owner reference group advising it, may improve understanding of the diverse 
community values attached to water sources in the region. 
 
Generally, the NT respondents argued that the NWC is satisfied with the NT’s 
performance in meeting NWI commitments, particularly given the complex conditions 
present in the NT for implementing reform (such as lack of demand for water). Currently 
a register is required under legislation, the NT is part of the NWMS development process, 
and interviewees highlighted that there are 220 licenses across the NT (at the time of data 
collection). The current register identifies owners, postal address, location and size of 
entitlement, and the source. It was argued in the NT that prices were unlikely to be 
revealed in the NT register for some time. Commonwealth interviewees asserted that 
prices are crucial to the functioning of an efficient register. The NWMS process was 
envisaged to create a standard for registers, and improvements were identified for the NT 
register.   
 
4.1.3 Queensland  
 
Interviewees highlighted the robust trading framework involving Sunwater and its 
clients in supplemented (regulated) systems across Queensland. However, the study 
area in the north is almost all unsupplemented (unregulated), with only two WRP’s in 
the Gulf and the Mitchell, and the rights and ability to trade have a different set of 
management needs (compared to supplemented systems). Interviewees reflected that 
Queensland has met all its NWI commitments, particularly the register, accounting 
and metering arrangements. There are internal metrics, such as for the pace of 
planning rollout across Queensland. However, planning has taken more time than 
anticipated due to the intensive level of public consultation and scientific assessment. 
Planning has largely been focused on surface water resources and several catchments 
in the study area have been subject to Wild Rivers declarations, which may restrict the 
level of development in high preservation zones. 
 
a description of existing property rights in water 
 
“The water allocation which is the entitlement is created under the Water Act 
and the Water Act specifies the mandatory attributes of both supplemented 
and unsupplemented water allocations and effectively the WRP and ROP… 
They effectively flesh out the right, in terms of the conditions under which you 
can take water.  The entitlement… [is] not something which is renewed every 
10 years [unlike previous arrangements]. What is refreshed every 10 years is 
essentially the conditions under which people can take water which is what the 
ROP’s do and its reviewed through a public process a bit like town plans 
which attenuate your freehold rights to land. The ROP’s really are attenuating 
your rights under which you take water. It’s very similar in that way, where 
there’s a statutory renewal process and timeframe for these things.” Water 
Expert, Queensland.  
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Title to land and water has been unbundled in areas where there are ROP’s in 
Queensland. A water entitlement is similar to land title in that they are mortgageable 
and local government rates are calculated according to the entitlements value. 
Entitlements are no longer subject to renewal and the water entitlement register in 
Queensland follows the Torrens land register system (and is operated through the 
same agency).  However, amendments to the WRP and ROP may alter the conditions 
of the entitlement, and reasonable compensation is only payable if the WRP is 
amended within its 10 year life and where the value of the entitlement has been 
affected. In supplemented systems water users have a contractual relationship with the 
water service provider, in most cases this is Sunwater, and the rules for trading are 
contained in ROP’s. There are varying degrees of reliability provided to entitlements 
in supplemented schemes with high priority generally for uses such as drinking 
supplies and medium to irrigation (sometimes mines may be granted high priority 
water and irrigators can purchase high priority water on the market). Interviewees 
identified the processes in moving towards creating an exclusive right to water, which 
involved changing relationships with local government and financial services 
companies in how they assess land values and obtain security. Often the value of 
water entitlements form a considerable part of farm worth. Interviewees identified the 
flexibility the system provides to users, with the ability to transfer across sectors and 
to highest and best use. 
 
existing and proposed means/strategies for complying with the NWI provisions  
 
Interviewees underscored the focus on planning in Queensland in meeting NWI 
commitments. Planning has been concentrated on surface water resources and generally 
located outside the study region (with only two WRP’s in the region). In north 
Queensland there have been catchments set aside under Wild Rivers declarations which 
prescribe the level of development. Developing a robust water planning framework 
according to interviewees supports sustainable water use in ways specific to each 
catchment. Tom Crothers, GM Water Allocation and Planning, DERM (QLD) offers that: 
 
“We adapt policies to each of the specific issues in the plan, because it’s very 
hard to have a one size fits all approach. We have some general policy 
principles that fit right across the State, we have a team here in our water 
planning unit that overview those policy principles. In each plan you have 
some idiosyncrasies and you need to pick up on local issues.”  
 
A rule based approach is used to conserve environmental flows and protect third party 
users. Markets can then operate efficiently to reallocate water among users. The 
entitlement registry system in Queensland, along with Victoria, is viewed as a benchmark. 
There has also been significant progress in water accounting and metering. A number of 
interviewees reflected that Queensland was further advanced in implementing water 
trading frameworks than other jurisdictions in the north. However, interviewees offered 
that the conditions present in each jurisdiction influence the pace of reform. A water 
policy expert articulates: 
 
"I reckon, if you look at where we are in Queensland versus where others are 
in each state I would say there are differences and I think the reasons for those 
differences are legitimate. If you look at WA they are a different place…there 
are different sets of issues. They have a big groundwater component which the 
NWI and COAG never really nailed and to be quite blunt the tools which you 
 38 
need to support specification of property rights and the creation of good plans 
are not as good for groundwater at this point as it is for surface water. It’s 
harder. So you could get high and mighty and say WA are a long way behind 
Queensland, but it’s because they have a different problem than Queensland. 
Queensland really set out from a position where we had three things. We had 
the will to get on with it, we said that right that’s COAG lets do it. We had the 
glorious position of not having a majorly over-allocated system in the first 
place, we had the ability to say alright lets stop there and we had a little room 
to move to get to that limit. So it wasn’t a hard position compared to most of 
the southern States. And, thirdly we picked the easy bits, like we’ve done very 
little creation of tradable rights in groundwater in any parts of Queensland. 
We’ve picked the ones which are much easier to define and model and 
simulate, which is all the surface water stuff." 
 
Queensland has been able to progress institutional arrangements for water markets 
because of political will, having catchments that were not over allocated (where reform 
may often require negotiation and compensation) and by focusing on surface water which 
was simpler to characterise for water sharing arrangements. However, it was emphasised 
that in the north there are more complex issues and interviewees identified the challenges 
in planning and developing trading rules in groundwater, as well as understanding the 
extent of customary and ecological values.  
4.1.4 Western Australia 
 
Western Australia (WA) signed up to the NWI last in 2006 and interviewees identified 
the difficulties faced by Western Australia in passing NWI consistent legislation (where 
land and water are unbundled), as well as the challenges for reform in WA where 
groundwater predominates. The state currently employs those criteria used for assessment 
by the NWC to evaluate its performance in meeting NWI commitments, and WA also has 
an NWI implementation plan guiding reform. WA has pursued reform in accounting and 
has a pilot project for metering, and is also a part of the NWMS to progress its register. In 
the study region there has been a surface water plan developed for the Ord River scheme 
and a draft plan for the La Grange aquifer (south of Broome). However, during interviews 
it was emphasised by interviewees that changing climatic condition in the south West 
may impose pressure in the future on the north’s water resources (either for intra-state 
transfer or encouraging a migration of farmers north). Supporting Indigenous access and 
involvement in water markets was viewed as an important feature of institutional 
arrangements and is discussed in section 4.2.  
 
a description of existing property rights in water 
 
A licensing regime exists in WA for water where applicants require access to land to be 
eligible for a water license. Licensees must not be speculative, there must be actual use 
which is consistent with the license otherwise licenses are revoked without compensation 
(interviewees reflected that this may change under proposed legislation expected to take 
effect in 2010 or 2011). There are limits on extraction in water resource management 
units (WRMU), licensees are subject to conditions and volumetric limits set out in water 
allocation plans.  The level of allocation in each WRMU commences at C1 (25% of 
consumptive pool allocated), C2 (50%) and trading is not likely to occur until allocation 
reaches C3 (75%) to C4 (100%) which is full allocation of the consumptive pool or 
allocation limit. Where the level of allocation increases there is requirement for more 
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investigation and consultation to determine the sustainability of extraction— and 
allocation limits may be adjusted accordingly. There are various mechanisms for 
government in WA to develop water markets under current legislation.  Water may be 
auctioned once there is some level of scarcity in a system, or a floor price may be set for 
users buying into a system. However, outside irrigation schemes administrative 
mechanisms are used to allocate water to landholders for projected use that is assessed as 
reasonable.  
 
Interviewees from WA emphasised that the use of market based mechanisms for water is 
increasingly being considered in the near future— and despite the fact that land and water 
remain bundled alternatives are being canvassed to facilitate trading. There are still issues 
with trying to establish trading in groundwater, Ed Hauck, Manager Strategic Projects, 
Department of Water WA articulates the thinking in WA: 
 
In a sense markets hold an economic value by virtue of an entitlement to 
water.  Such an entitlement infers the legal separation of land and water titles. 
You should be able to take your water entitlement to the bank, as you would a 
land title, and the bank would lend you funds using your water entitlement as 
security.  However, there is still some critical thinking required around 
groundwater, particularly the aspect of separation of land and water access.  
In a fully used system if you want a market that is effective in terms of being 
responsive to demand for water and if you accept the cost of transitioning to 
markets may generate ‘windfall gains’ for some water users, then yes the 
separation of land and water title is a necessary thing.  In cases where the 
public interest controls the majority of a particular water resource then 
perhaps a different form of trading from that envisioned by the NWI can occur 
based on the agreed use of water over a given period of time.    
     `  
Interviewees identified that the demand for water across the State may not necessitate 
markets, that different approaches may be more appropriate in WA. Co-operatives have 
been under scrutiny as providing a restraint on market entry, particularly constraints on 
selling outside the co-operative (and scheme). However, some interviewees emphasised 
the role that co-operatives play an important role in managing trades between members, 
promoting water efficiency, providing new infrastructure and services to members. Ian 
Loh, Senior Planner, Department of Water (WA) indicated the following, that customers 
of irrigation co-operatives obtain their rights to water through a two tiered water 
entitlement system in WA.  Co-operatives hold a water licence, issued under the Rights in 
Water and Irrigation Act (1914), to take water from a watercourse (or other water 
resource).  Customers hold shares in the co-operative that define their individual rights to 
water. The co-operative can trade their (bulk) entitlement, in accord with the licensing 
provisions of the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act (1914).  Co-operative members can 
trade their shares between members in accord with the Articles of Association of their co-
operative.  Members may trade their rights to the co-operative and the co-operative to 
other parties outside the co-operative.  That is, any individual wishing to trade 
entitlements outside the co-operative, must do so with the approval and support of the co-
operative.  As elsewhere in Australia, co-operatives in WA are concerned about 
protecting their customer base and have resisted such trades.  However, one co-operative 
has traded some of their licensed entitlements, originally provided for distribution losses, 
to the public water supply authority. The financial income from the trade enabled the co-
operative to pipe their irrigation supply scheme, thereby enabling the co-operative to trade 
their surplus (distribution loss) entitlements to the public water supply authority over a 
 40 
five year period. (Note that the on-farm component of their entitlement was not changed 
by the trade). Ian Loh, described that: 
 
 "While the Irrigation Co-ops will continue to protect their own customer 
base, I see this downside as being insufficient to override the benefits of 
having the Irrigation Co-ops manage the water trades between their members 
locally, promote water efficiency within their district and improve the service 
to their members .” 
 
Some interviewees reflected that the co-operative system may reduce the flexibility of 
members to sell entitlement to non members, and may reduce the area under irrigation 
(having impacts on the scheme generally such as economies of scale and development of 
infrastructure). However, in the Ord, there is protection offered through the Mutual, 
which is assigned with assets and is particularly important for insurance of assets in the 
Ord (this is especially so where natural disasters could destroy assets of members that are 
non-insurable). Interviewees noted that financial services companies seeking to obtain 
security over a water entitlement found that co-operatives present challenges, as the 
entitlement is not provided to the individual. Interviewees suggested that some form of 
innovation may be important to provide greater flexibility to co-operative members and 
financial services companies.  
 
existing and proposed means/strategies for complying with the NWI provisions (esp. 
rules relating to establishing and operating water markets) 
 
The focus on reform in WA has been in preparing new legislation as well as developing 
the planning framework. Interviewees identified a state-wide policy number 6 which 
promotes tradeable water entitlements. The measures used to assess water reform in WA 
are those produced by the NWC and that set out in the State’s NWI implementation plan. 
There has been work in WA on water accounting and initiatives for metering. Developing 
markets, interviewees emphasised would be through the co-operative structures in surface 
water. For groundwater the development of trading rules required further work and 
interviewees reflected that this was a complex issue (this is discussed later in the 
constraints section). Several interviewees emphasised that in the north of WA there may 
be little applicability of market based mechanisms for water as problems of scarcity do 
not exist (with reliability being 95% for irrigators in the Ord scheme).  Among 
interviewees there is recognition that there may be a migration of irrigators to the north as 
supply becomes constrained in the south. The situation in the north through the co-
operatives is described by Geoff Strickland, CEO Ord Irrigation Co-operative, who 
elaborates:  
 
"I think we all know where the NWI is coming from in terms of water savings 
in the Murray Darling. But we also acknowledge that some initiatives are 
quite irrelevant to a place that has an increasing supply of water and a very 
small irrigation usage from the storage supply. There’s not a great incentive 
for us to strive for incredibly high efficiencies, it costs us a fortune in 
infrastructure and maintenance to do it and the members don’t benefit at all. 
Until agriculture expands, there’s no market for saved water.”  
 
Interviewees identified that the need for markets in the north is different to contexts 
where water scarcity exists. However, in WA some interviewees believe that the certainty 
perpetual entitlements could provide would encourage investment in the north, especially 
given that irrigators in the Ord only have 5 year licenses. But, according to interviewees 
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development shall continue to occur through the two tiered co-operative system because 
of the benefits the structure applies to licensees. Interviewees also emphasised that the 
benefits of localising management of water delivery outweigh the challenges of restricting 
trading to members of the co-operative.  
 
4.2 Features of Northern Australia 
 
In analysing the institutional arrangements for establishing water markets in northern 
Australia, there were some common features across the region important to the 
implementation of the NWI reform agenda. These features included: a relative lack of 
scarcity and how this influences the development of institutional arrangements; as well as 
the prominence of Indigenous interests, Indigenous access to water and Indigenous 
cultural and economic aspirations around water. This part also looks at policies on inter-
basin trading and cross border issues; mining related water access; and, non market 
methods of allocation.  
 
Developing institutional arrangements for markets before scarcity and competition 
 
Across northern Australia, in WA, QLD and the NT, non market methods of water 
allocation are generally used, with market based mechanisms only relevant in a few cases. 
To obtain a water license, for instance in the NT, a proponent, who must have access to 
land, lodges a land use plan with a reasonable assessment of water required to NRETAS. 
If this projection and use is deemed appropriate a license is granted. The Controller of 
Water Resources in the NT, Ian Lancaster offers that “the present practice is traditional, 
but still allows for a water trading market, albeit restricted.” Most interviewees agreed 
that without competition and scarcity there is no pressing need for market based 
instruments in north Australia (with a few exceptions), and that the transitions in an 
under-allocated setting is complex, and the cost benefit for broadly implementing 
institutional and regulatory reform is unfavourable.  
 
While the function of markets themselves may be constrained, establishing institutional 
arrangements such as planning, accounting and metering are viewed as important. Staying 
with the NT example, the recognition that markets are an important tool for managing 
water resources is widely accepted among policy makers and regulators, John Childs, 
who is Chair of the Daly River Management Advisory Committee (DRMAC) and the 
TRaCK Program Management Committee argues that "From a policy point of view, why 
wouldn’t you want it [water] to be traded, it’s a rational use of a resource, a limited 
resource. It leads to highest and best value use of that resource. But this is only 
marginally relevant in the NT. There are limited cases where this applies...In other cases 
it is cheaper to get a license than buy water." This point was echoed in unregulated and 
unsupplemented systems in WA and QLD that the potential for creating market 
frameworks is subject to a different (if not complex) set of management requirements. 
But the case for introducing the institutional underpinnings for a market before reaching 
scarcity is articulated by Will Fargher, acting General Manager, Water Markets and 
Efficiency Group, NWC:  
 
"There is a case for not waiting until you reach full allocation before 
considering the institutional arrangements required for trade… as it is 
possible to pre-empt those… There is much to be learned from the southern 
States in this regard, where the water allocation and management framework 
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has had to be retrofitted with necessary institutional and administrative 
arrangements required for trade…at a higher cost and with more legacy 
issues than had the system been established with trading in mind…In ten or 
twenty years time when it is likely there will be significantly less water 
available than at present for irrigated agriculture in the MDB, and further 
development and perhaps full allocation in the north… then trade will be an 
important part of ensuring efficient allocation and use of water… Given the 
time required to introduce the water planning, entitlement, allocation, 
registry, accounting and metering arrangements to enable trade, plus given 
that these measures are important to best practice water resource 
management regardless, there is a strong case for work to begin now.” 
 
In light of projected climatic trends (which seem to indicate stable rainfall in the north), 
setting the pre-conditions for trade may enable regulators and policy makers to create a 
strategic path forward in managing water sustainably through a robust and adaptive 
market framework. Interviewees suggested that there is a benefit in having ground rules 
for establishing water markets in place even though markets are unlikely to be introduced 
in many areas for years to come. However, areas experiencing increased competition for 
water would benefit from a clear pathway for establishment of water markets (such as the 
Tindall aquifer in Katherine NT for example). Ed Hauck, Manager Strategic Projects, 
Department of Water WA offers that:  
 
"There is a need to consider market based mechanisms where competition for 
available water exists.  Markets tend to develop in places that experience a 
significant growth in water use, especially in areas with a concentration in 
demand for water.  If there is an agreed market mechanism that government 
and water users can work to then everybody is informed of the rules up front. 
This can defuse conflict and the possible pollicisation of water sharing 
decisions. Currently market activity is minimal or non-existent in most areas 
in WA and where water is available for allocation it can generally be accessed 
for the cost of establishing water infrastructure." 
 
So creating a market mechanism that can be applied in the north over time will facilitate 
access to water that reflects its true value.  This would provide alternatives to more 
traditional arrangements for sharing water that may not result in efficient water use and 
could hinder development by not recognising higher value uses of water. Interviewees 
also discussed that a market based approach could potentially offer a revenue stream for 
Indigenous groups where their interests were recognised, and this is discussed later in this 
section. 
 
Without a pressing need for markets to allocate water, jurisdictions in northern Australia 
have been undertaking planning in surface and some groundwater resources (especially in 
the NT). In establishing the parameters for markets (such as what is the sustainable take 
in consumptive pools), jurisdictions have generally taken a precautionary approach. 
 
General approach to NWI led reform 
 
When setting the parameters for markets through planning processes (such as WRP’s or 
WAP’s), a precautionary approach is being adopted in the north across all the 
jurisdictions. This planning has entailed rigorous assessments driven by scientific and 
technical assessment (often with the use of independent panels or contractors) with public 
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consultation (the use of Community Reference Groups in Queensland and Water 
Advisory Committees in the NT), which has been a priority for relevant water 
departments. Tom Crothers, GM Water Allocation and Planning, DERM (QLD) 
highlights that the:  
 
“…view of the NWC is that we are meeting them [NWI objectives] too slowly. 
They would like us to get our planning frameworks in place quicker. Our view 
is we are better off doing a thorough job, putting a robust framework in place, 
and coming back with no regrets later, rather than doing a rushed job that 
will require follow up changes.” 
 
This precautionary or ‘quality’ approach is emulated in all the jurisdictions, with for 
example only 50 GL/y assigned to the consumptive pool in the La Grange draft plan in 
WA, only one quarter of what was requested by the initial proponent put forward for an 
irrigation development proposal a decade ago. The increased time taken in developing 
plans in the north can be attributed to the relative lack of knowledge on many of these 
catchments and aquifers on the characteristics of the resource, the vast geographic 
distances involved in undertaking field work, a prioritisation of departmental resources on 
more pressing issues in urban areas and the south (in WA and Queensland), and for 
stakeholder consultation which often involves a large Indigenous population many of 
whom speak English as a second language.  
 
Other characteristic features of the north 
 
Overall, the features of the north demonstrate that the implementation of a water reform 
agenda is occurring in each jurisdiction but this is prioritised by relevant departments 
according to need (which is often where demand and population are). As Wilf Finn, 
Manager Water Markets and Efficiency Group, at the NWC identifies in the north, the 
key features are: 
 
“... It’s at an early stage of development overall, however there a few 
differences from the outset. First of all, the southern states have a longer 
administrative history of doing this work, not to say they are better resourced, 
but they have more institutional experience. Secondly, there are different 
seasonal and climatic considerations. The third is a stronger Indigenous 
involvement in the north.” 
 
There are some features that are generally shared across the north, while each jurisdiction 
is unique (and each shall be discussed later in this section), the table below summarises 
the important features around the establishment of water markets shared across each State 
and Territory in northern Australia. 
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Table 5: Shared features relevant to the establishment of water markets in   northern Australia 
 
Features 
• Unregulated and unconnected systems (importance of groundwater) 
• Lack of infrastructure 
• Seasonality and evaporation 
• Stable climatic and rainfall trends 
• Socio-economic issues for Indigenous peoples 
• Land tenure issues (native title, pastoral, Aboriginal freehold) 
• Importance of cultural and environmental flows 
• Under-allocated systems 
• Resource driven economies 
 
Table 2 highlights that there is seasonality in many of the water resources in northern 
Australia, with water becoming scarce during the dry season (this is also when many 
irrigators require water) and that infrastructure for irrigation is undeveloped and severely 
constrained by evaporation. In the context of northern Queensland, Tom Crothers, GM 
Water Allocation and Planning, DERM (QLD) describes that:  
 
"... Our water systems up here, they’re different to southern Australia where 
they rely on storage and snow fed rivers. There are only four major storages 
in the Queensland part of north Australia, the rest of the water users rely on 
run of river flows, which are boom and bust situations. In the dry you are flat 
out finding a base flow in some of these rivers. So irrigation is boom and bust 
in this situation. In Mt Isa there is 2.5 meters of evaporation, so if you have 
storage it’s going to have high evaporation rates which questions the 
economic viability of irrigation." 
 
Generally, most catchments across northern Australia are unallocated or under-allocated, 
with land tenure issues being very different from the predominant freehold title in 
southern Australia. Most of the land base across northern Australia is Aboriginal freehold 
(mainly in the NT under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 1976), vacant crown land 
or pastoral lease which generally requires native title processes before non-pastoral 
development can occur. Indigenous Australians make up a considerable part of the 
population across northern Australia and there are initiatives to improve the socio-
economic situation of Indigenous Australians in the region. Also, many catchments and 
aquifers are unregulated or unsupplemented and a plan may not be finalised (or statutory). 
Water may be required for maintaining biodiversity or for cultural purposes, and the 
actual quantity required must be considered in developing water plans. Interviewees 
reflected that identifying the volumes of water for maintaining social, cultural and 
ecological values, as well as evaluating the potential for third party impacts makes the 
planning process more complex, as well as time and resource intensive. Interviewees 
underscored the extent and detail of water allocation plans and how these ecological and 
social parameters in plans are pre-tested. Once water plans are developed, for example in 
supplemented and regulated systems in the south, users then operate within the guidelines 
of relevant plans (and where appropriate markets may then be used to reallocate water 
among the range of users). The north presents more complex issues according to 
interviewees, particularly given the importance of cultural and biodiversity values, and 
the interaction of groundwater with these values (interviewees emphasised that 
groundwater resources are less understood and more prevalent in the north). Randall Cox, 
Director, Strategic Water Policy (DERM), elaborates on the differences between 
supplemented and unsupplemented systems in Queensland: 
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“For supplemented water entitlements we go to a lot of trouble during the 
water resource planning process to pre-test the kind of trades that that water 
users are most likely to want to arrange. By doing this we set bounds within 
which trades can be approved without affecting our ability to meet 
environmental flow objectives and the water supplies of other water users. 
These bounds become rules in the water plans and trades have to be 
completed in accordance with the rules. For example, a rule might say that the 
no more than 1000 ML can be transferred into a particular reach of a river 
from other reaches.  These arrangements means that most market activity can 
happen quickly with confidence that the environment and other water users 
will not be unreasonably affected by market activity. Trading of 
unsupplemented water entitlements, such as water harvesting entitlements and 
groundwater entitlements is much more difficult. When the place of extraction 
of unsupplemented entitlements are changed environmental flows and the 
water supplies of others users can easily be affected. These trades need to be 
considered more on a case by case basis. Most of the flow in northern 
Australia is unsupplemented.” 
 
Because of this level of uncertainty in the north, in allocating water in unregulated or 
unsupplemented systems, decision makers have applied the precautionary principle in 
defining the consumptive pool. Interviewees noted the initiatives occurring to improve 
understanding of water resources in northern Australia. 
 
Interviewees emphasised that most of these river systems in the north have little 
connectivity and they are unlike the MDB where a functioning market can work within 
the same system across States. The unconnected nature of systems in the north restricts 
the ability for a market by reducing competition among users, as well as constraining the 
potential for transfer from catchment to catchment. This may in any case have important 
environmental impacts and thus be limited by legislation. However, in terms of 
uncertainty around supply because of climate change some interviewees identified that 
the north, according to the best available science, is likely to maintain a stable climate and 
rainfall regime into the near future, which is in contrast to most of the growing regions in 
southern Australia.  Ed Hauck, Manager Strategic Projects, Department of Water (WA) 
said that: 
 
"The trends in northern Australia as I understand them are for a relatively 
stable rainfall regime. If you look out to 2030 and beyond to 2050, credible 
scientific analysis shows there will likely be no significant change from 
historical rainfall. Of course this needs to be considered in the context of 
uncertainty that comes with climate science. This contrasts with the projected 
decrease in rainfall in many parts of southern Australia where there is a 
higher level of water use, more fully used systems and a growing scarcity in 
freshwater resources.  So as competition for available water becomes more 
intense people will look north. But there are some very big steps along the 
way." 
 
With trends identifying the potential for greater demand for northern Australia’s water 
over the medium-to-long-term, importance is being placed in generating greater 
understanding on the characteristics of these water resources. However, there are urgent 
priorities on departmental resources in the south of these jurisdictions where supply is 
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projected to be constrained over time. Nonetheless, an issue which is growing in 
importance is Indigenous involvement in water management and planning, particularly in 
discussion on northern Australia, as well as the potential for an Indigenous reserve in a 
consumptive pool. Indigenous interests are seeking a role as the institutional 
arrangements for water markets are being developed. 
Indigenous access to water 
 
"My view is that the role and engagement of Aboriginal people should be 
integral to any water planning and development, and management of water in 
northern Australia… [Also] given that people want to live on country and they 
live on the lands then there is a human asset for people like the NWC, the State 
and Territory water management departments..." Joe Ross, Chair Indigenous 
Water Policy Group  
 
“The conversation has moved away from involvement to a rights based 
approach in the consumptive pool.” Robbie Dalton, Policy Advisor, Northern 
Land Council 
 
Discussion in interviews tended to focus on the importance of Indigenous peoples across 
northern Australia in developing water markets— in particular the role of Indigenous 
people and their level of involvement in water planning and trading frameworks. The 
NWI (2004) provides in clauses 52-54 for Indigenous access to water and involvement in 
water planning where reasonable. While cultural values are generally grouped and 
protected under environmental flows in the water planning process, there were questions 
raised in interviews about whether this is appropriate. Also, Indigenous groups are asking 
for a portion of the consumptive pool for economic development (at present or in the 
future). The form of Indigenous involvement in water markets is being assessed by 
various governments, the IWPG and NAILSMA at present. Obviously the importance of 
participating in water markets and the realisable economic benefits will differ among 
Indigenous communities. However, ensuring that there is some involvement, whether as 
an Indigenous reserve (which may include community drinking water, cultural water and 
water in the consumptive pool) or an entitlement (which could be for cultural or 
consumptive water and be either traded temporarily or permanently) is important. But in 
the NT for example, the Indigenous Reserve is for consumptive purposes only (for 
commercial development) because there can be no trade between consumptive and non 
consumptive uses. Further work in the area in WA will determine the policy options 
available for Indigenous access to water, but cultural values have been recognised in the 
La Grange aquifer draft plan. In Queensland a cultural license has been made available 
for 10 ML, and there is discussion on the availability of commercial licenses for 
Indigenous people. While an Indigenous reserve and/or entitlement are theoretically 
possible in a consumptive pool, some Indigenous groups are asserting that there are 
Indigenous rights to water that are yet to be fully recognised. This is a broader issue and 
interviewees in government emphasised that this debate around Indigenous rights to water 
is probably best determined in the courts. Some interviewees offered that greater political 
and legal leverage in the Northern Territory may precipitate swifter movement to a right 
or rights to water than in WA or Queensland. 
 
Explored next in greater detail are the implications for water markets for Indigenous 
people in northern Australia, the level of consultation and engagement in water planning, 
as well as the concept of Indigenous involvement in a water market framework. 
 47 
 
Implications of water markets 
 
The interaction of NWI driven water reform raises complex issues for Indigenous people 
across northern Australia. On one hand questions emerge about the implications for 
Indigenous cultural obligations, for example, Dave Munday, Regional Manager for the 
Kimberley Department of Water raises the issue that "A part of the NWI is removing 
water from land. [We have developed] the La Grange draft allocation plan [in the west 
Kimberley] it’s a groundwater resource. We don’t really understand the resource that 
well so we’ve been conservative. The Fitzroy gravels and La Grange are connected, there 
are shared wetlands, songs and stories, [and] if you allocate to a grower that might affect 
the marshes. Culturally it’s not possible to split water and land, you can’t separate them." 
Several participants identified that joining the world of water trading could impose a form 
of double jeopardy on Indigenous people– while Indigenous groups may gain monetarily 
from trading this may at the same time have detrimental impacts for meeting cultural 
obligations, and vice versa. On the other hand, Robbie Dalton Policy Advisor, Northern 
Land Council voices that participation and involvement in the water reform process is 
necessary and should be encouraged, “There are concerns about being locked out [of 
water markets] when there are few economic opportunities or resources available to 
Indigenous people. Northern Australia has disadvantaged people, and here is an 
opportunity to do something… pulling people out of poverty is a good outcome.”  
Motivating Indigenous interests is that this is an opportunity to be a direct beneficiary in 
the allocation of a resource. It was noted that there would be no compulsion for 
Indigenous groups to trade their entitlement or reserve. 
 
While active involvement in water markets is an objective for land councils, NAILSMA 
and the Indigenous Water Policy Group (IWPG), this growing recognition that 
participation in the water economy may offer opportunity should be tempered by 
economic realities, as Ed Hauck, Manager Strategic Projects, Department of Water (WA) 
argues: 
 
"The anticipation of value of markets maybe overrated where there is low 
level of use. Remember that water for traditional cultural uses and 
environmental needs is quarantined outside water that is potentially available 
in a water market – so its water for commercial uses I’m referring to. It’s not 
the water market itself that holds value, it’s what you do with the water that 
reflects value in the market, and water scarcity drives the market.  Water 
markets mature as the availability of water decreases.  Limits to water use are 
defined in water allocation plans and the level of use is regulated through 
instruments such as water licences.  Defining potential uses of water for 
commercial purposes therefore becomes important to Aboriginal communities 
who seek to benefit from developing water markets.   However, in cases where 
water systems are fully used, without a clearly thought out use for water, 
buying into a water market might not be the best investment across the range 
of needs in the Aboriginal community." 
 
Interviewees emphasised that the potential for water to facilitate business development 
opportunities for Indigenous groups, or to enable the lease of water entitlements they may 
hold, will be dependent on the conditions present to support water based economic 
activities in each community. While it is identified that the potential to generate value 
from water trading and markets is in many cases limited across the study region (and 
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constraints are discussed later in this section), it was viewed as being important to 
participate at the outset in the development of a water trading framework, to further the 
cultural, social and economic objectives of Indigenous groups in the study region. Joe 
Ross, Chair of the IWPG describes the movement towards Indigenous involvement in the 
consumptive pool: 
 
“[An] issue on people’s radar screens is the…development of a consumptive 
pool and water trading which is in my mind is a long way off. It would be 
detrimental for Aboriginal people to not participate in the debate now because 
regardless if its 20 years off the rules are being made as we speak. Now, I 
think we’ve only got a window of opportunity in northern Australia of about 
three years and then the system and the legislation…has been developed– 
either including Aboriginal people or not including (but subject to prior 
informed consent)." 
 
Therefore, Indigenous groups are lobbying to play a role in shaping and developing the 
institutional arrangements for water trading across northern Australia. The alternative 
according to a number of interviewees is to have Indigenous interests effectively excluded 
from this process, which may reduce the level of control Indigenous interests can exercise 
in water management and planning (which some interviewees argued may reduce the 
ability of Indigenous people to meet customary responsibilities), and if markets develop 
this could limit the economic benefits they derive from a trading framework.  
 
Consultation and Engagement 
 
The NWI sought to enhance statutory water planning in the States and Territories, and in 
doing this improve Indigenous involvement in planning through formal stakeholder 
consultation and engagement processes. Indigenous involvement in water planning 
supports the identification of cultural and ecological values (some may be native title 
rights and thus protected under s 211 of the Native Title Act), and often these rights are 
grouped under environmental water. While most interviewees identified an increasing 
intent by government to consult and engage Indigenous people, there were concerns 
among some interviewees that current methods of consultation are unsuitable for many 
Indigenous communities, and fail to engage Indigenous people adequately in ways that 
build understanding or awareness of water planning, or water reform in general. In saying 
this, a number of participants underscored the constraints that hamper government 
consultation efforts such as time and resources (particularly in undertaking consultations 
over the vast distances in the north), human capital (particularly the level of 
understanding of Western systems and English in Indigenous communities) and level of 
community interest. Interviewees underscored that often water planning issues are 
complex and communicating these to all stakeholders can be challenging. However, 
consultation and engagement with Indigenous stakeholders is an important area that 
requires further focus and there a number of processes occurring to overcome some of 
these constraints. Interviewees identified community education programs, (while 
themselves resource and time intensive) as having some scope to improve outcomes, and 
the NWC has funded the IWPG and Indigenous Community Water Facilitators across the 
north to work in communities to encourage greater awareness of water management 
issues generally.  
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Northern Territory 
 
In the NT the Tindall aquifer water allocation plan is complete and there are several other 
draft plans in different stages of completion in the tropical belt. The creation of the Daly 
River Management Advisory Committee (DRMAC) and the Daly River Aboriginal 
Reference Group, which is representative of Indigenous clans in the Daly River 
catchment, were viewed as important mechanisms for stakeholder input, informing 
government and setting the parameters for development in the region. As Robbie Dalton, 
Land and Sea Manager, Northern Land Council offers: 
 
“Thus far a combination of policy and NLC people are supporting 
consultation. There is the Daly River Aboriginal Reference Group, which 
provides expert advice and feeds into DRMAC, who are experts. They are 
recognising that Indigenous people are experts on their country and they are 
advising outcomes.”  
 
The Aboriginal Reference Group model is seen as important through having direct 
traditional owner involvement in planning processes. Some interviewees thought that the 
time taken for consultation (providing ample time for stakeholders to develop advice), 
and the status accorded to Indigenous knowledge was a significant step forward. 
However, there is a realisation that no matter how much consultation is undertaken some 
views cannot be accepted or integrated into the planning process, and over time there may 
be changes to these views. Thus, the ability to have flexibility built into institutional 
arrangements is important, as John Childs, Chair of TRaCK Program Management 
Committee and DRMAC describes: 
 
 “A lot of effort has been made to consult everyone– the whole process has 
been extended to accommodate everyone and then more re-consultation. At the 
end of it all, issues will arise with some people, but if we have an adaptive 
management framework things can be adjusted in time. You don’t need 
everything right; we have the precautionary latitude to adjust.” 
 
It was acknowledged that in the NT there is awareness that despite the amount of 
consultation and engagement that has occurred through DRMAC and similar initiatives, 
that there is required flexibility to adjust plans over time to reflect changes in beliefs and 
values of stakeholders. As well this allows for changing environmental conditions to be 
accommodated in water sharing arrangements.  
 
Queensland 
 
In north QLD, several interviewees argued that there is an extensive consultation 
framework that informs water planning, these include in regions such as Cape York a 
Community Reference Group, there is also a Regional Advisory Council, and an 
Indigenous Reference Group. As well, in implementing legislation to conserve specific 
free flowing rivers under the Wild Rivers Act (2005) there were various meetings and 
consultations around water management and planning. The QLD water planning 
framework to establish a WRP is time and resource intensive, and seeks to attempt to 
involve the public in meaningful ways. As one interviewee who wished to remain 
anonymous argues: 
 
"I don’t know of any other process that goes to this extent… [and] the detail of 
the prescriptive consultation in WRP’s. There is a lot of fine tuning of plans 
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that comes from this. It’s the reason why it takes years, its something you can’t 
knock over in 12 o 18 months. There are several rounds of consultation and 
we try to get maximum consensus before we finalise a plan. We give groups an 
opportunity to put people up on these panels." 
 
Consultation may not often meet the needs of Indigenous people who often don’t have the 
capacity to effectively engage in processes or within the timeframes set for water 
planning. In other ways, water is but one issue of many for Indigenous groups, and often 
this may not be as pressing an issue as health for example. Terry Piper, Chief Operating 
Officer of Balkanu Development Corporation argues:  
 
"One of the things government doesn’t realise, is that when you’re engaging in 
remote areas with Indigenous people that are widely dispersed on concepts 
that are often new or not well supported, the consultation takes quite a while, 
[and] while they may allocate 5 months for consultation, this often means just 
one visit to remote people. When you’ve got so many people to see, that one 
visit just skims the surface…People do not formulate an informed view of 
complex matters in one discussion. The problem with government is they don’t 
have the money to do a proper assessment and consultation… no matter what 
traditional owners say about certain things the government is not going to 
take it on board because Government is unwilling to fund the necessary 
studies. Government expects the public and traditional owners…to come 
forward and make informed submissions without any funding or support, it 
reverses the onus of proof..."                                                                                       
 
The processes in place to allow for public input in establishing WRP’s may not 
necessarily accommodate the needs of Indigenous people, and allowing for Indigenous 
interests to engage in ways appropriate to their needs may be constrained by time and 
departmental budgets. Indigenous people in northern QLD generally may not always have 
the capacity or resources to engage effectively in the science or provide enough input into 
the planning process.  
 
Western Australia 
 
In northern WA, there have been various planning processes such as the La Grange 
aquifer draft plan, and the final plan for the Ord River scheme. There are no statutory 
planning processes in WA, but the Department of Water has funded a position in its 
Kununurra Office to support consultation and engagement efforts with the Kimberley 
Indigenous population. The Kimberley region has a significant Indigenous population, 
and there is generally poor infrastructure (outside the Ord) and there are human capital 
issues among the Indigenous population (in relation to understanding the Western 
system). There have been negotiations for a gas hub in the Kimberley which has focused 
people’s time and energy in the region, as well in 2005 the Miriuwung Gajerrong people 
(MG Corp) native title holders for the lower Ord (including the Irrigation project) were 
involved in the negotiation of an Ord Final Agreement, which precluded the Department 
of Water from directly involving the group in planning for the lower Ord. The extent and 
method of consultation and engagement with Indigenous people is constrained by the 
level of human capital in communities in the Kimberley and resources have been focused 
on a variety of other issues. As well the planning process is evolving, as Dave Munday, 
Regional Manager Kimberley, Department of Water (WA) offers: 
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"There is very little money for consultation and… we didn’t have a template 
[for a water plan]. There is such low capacity in the Kimberley that we 
piggybacked with other meetings…I don’t think we had a clear vision of a 
plan and we really didn’t have the money to consult– it was frustrating…It has 
to be meaningful, consultation must be done appropriately but you can’t do fly 
in fly out meetings, you can’t build trust that way. But we don’t have the 
resources, they talk language up here and there’s no emails." 
 
While there is recognition that funding constrains the extent of formal consultation and 
engagement, there is the intent to consult and engage the Indigenous population. 
However, there are significant constraints to facilitating greater awareness and 
engagement in the region in water planning that requires further resourcing.  As Nolan 
Hunter, Deputy CEO of the Kimberley Land Council articulates: 
 
"We understand that the government has limitations, they’ve talked about their 
limited funds, whether its timeframes or resources. The intent is there though, 
we are talking more. If you’re determining the level of engagement in water 
management and planning, they understand that Indigenous people haven’t 
been engaged at the level needed. I believe that they [the Department of 
Water] are mindful that there needs to be further processes for engagement 
with Indigenous people outside the normal planning phase.  
 
While resources may support better outcomes, human capital issues often mean that more 
resources are not necessarily the solution to enhancing Indigenous engagement. The 
challenges interviewees argued revolve around the barriers in generating understanding 
on the planning process for Indigenous people in the region. While some interviewees 
identified that planning processes are more suited to planners and those with expertise in 
water, integrating Indigenous knowledge and ensuring Indigenous involvement is an issue 
which is growing in importance.  
 
The approach to planning in the Kimberley may not necessarily involve Indigenous 
people in a formal way, but interviewees reflected that it has aimed to promote capacity 
building and generate outcomes ‘on the ground.’ This adaptive approach to planning and 
processes for consultation and engagement in the Kimberley emerged because of the 
pressing need to enhance capacity. Interviewees acknowledged that it is important to 
engage closely with Indigenous people when issues directly affect their livelihoods. Also, 
there are cultural issues that need to be considered in planning, such as whom are relevant 
Indigenous stakeholders to a plan, what ‘country’ can Indigenous people talk for, and 
where is Indigenous peoples’ input relevant. A common approach or standard to 
consultation and engagement to ensure accountability and transparency is required to 
maintain positive outcomes— there are various research and policy processes being 
undertaken to achieve this, Paul Lane, Executive Officer, the Kimberley Institute outlines 
the work his organisation is involved with relating to the La Grange draft allocation plan 
(and its consultation process). This work he states will develop a “…a comprehensive 
position for those three native title holding groups [involved in La Grange] and will 
certainly form a basis for understanding across the wider Kimberley native title 
groupings. And any of the research work or the legal work that we do in the La Grange 
should have application across the broader Kimberley to some extent…” Furthermore, 
this process in the La Grange will progress discussions on the scope of Indigenous rights 
to water, which has grown from the extent of customary and subsistence rights to the 
potential for commercial rights for Indigenous people in the region. 
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Summary 
 
Interviewees emphasised that in each State and Territory the intent exists from 
government to support Indigenous involvement in water planning processes. However, 
there are various constraints to effectively consulting and engaging Indigenous people. 
This requires some innovative thinking to support planning processes, as resources alone 
may not necessarily overcome some of the capacity issues among Indigenous people in 
the region that limits engagement.   
 
Indigenous involvement in water markets 
 
There are processes occurring in each jurisdiction to explore options to facilitate 
Indigenous access into water markets. There is the potential for an Indigenous reserve in 
all jurisdictions (under the Cape York Heritage Act there has been 1% of mean annual 
flow reserve set aside for Indigenous people), or for an Indigenous entitlement that could 
be tradeable (in the jurisdictions this would not include non commercial values). A 
reserve would be a set aside which would include non commercial values such as 
community access to drinking water and water for customary use, as well as water for 
economic development (which may be leased or traded, or applied to land for irrigation). 
There may be a mix of both a reserve and entitlement, but whichever the form a clear 
distinction is required between non consumptive and consumptive uses to prevent trading 
between them. Interviewees representing Indigenous interests suggested that 
arrangements made between Indigenous groups and the State in the La Grange aquifer 
draft plan may establish a benchmark for further water planning (particularly in 
discussions around the consumptive pool. It was offered that the Indigenous interests 
would need to define a use and the volumes of water required to further aspirations in the 
consumptive pool. Whether native title rights extend to commercial rights to water was 
seen as a broader issue that would require a whole of government approach, or hearing in 
the courts.  
 
The form of Indigenous involvement within institutional arrangements is being assessed 
in each jurisdiction, Will Fargher, acting General Manager, Water Markets and Efficiency 
Group, NWC suggests: “…this is obviously an evolving area of policy and there will be a 
range of options worth considering... one of these could be for Indigenous people to 
secure stand alone entitlements to water equivalent to other consumptive entitlements... 
providing access to water for both cultural and economic use in a way which leaves 
decisions around the use of those entitlements to Indigenous people" While a reserve 
could preserve non consumptive uses and entrench an Indigenous position in the 
consumptive pool, the use of entitlements rather than rule based approaches is optimal in 
a market based system (to create flexibility). However, there are concerns about whether 
an entitlement could be traded by relevant Indigenous interests permanently.  A number 
of interviewees believed that it would not serve Indigenous interests if they could trade 
their entitlements permanently and then return to government at a later date asking for 
more water. Other interviewees felt that it would be paternalistic to not allow Indigenous 
people the ability to permanently trade water entitlements. Brendan Edgar, contends that, 
"I think right now there is a first mover advantage in the north to get a hold of water 
before there is a price on it…There is a huge opportunity to provide for the economic 
interests of Indigenous people. If communities then choose to sell their development 
entitlement then that’s their business”. Whatever the approach, involving Indigenous 
interests for purposes of equity, and offering potential economic development 
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opportunities is an important objective (particularly as the Federal Government aims to 
‘Close the Gap’ between Indigenous and non Indigenous socio-economic interests).  
 
Northern Territory  
 
"Indigenous equity is very important, 50% of land in the NT is Indigenous 
land. Are we going to sell water from under them? In Cape York Heritage 
Area, 1% of flow goes to Indigenous people. The question is whether that it is 
enough. An ideological commitment to markets may drive bad social 
outcomes." Ian Lancaster, Controller of Water Resources, NRETAS (NT) 
 
The NT has the largest percentage of Indigenous owned land in Australia, and there were 
concerns among interviewees that a shift to markets could exclude Indigenous people in 
the region from water resources on their own country. Therefore, providing security of 
access and a level of control is an important objective for Indigenous representative 
groups. In the NT, it was discussed by interviewees that 2% of groundwater resources in 
the Tindall aquifer plan area (around Katherine) was made available to native title holders 
(on condition that the claim is successful), reflecting the amount of land made available to 
claimants in native title processes (the formula for allocating water on Aboriginal 
freehold was not described in interviews). While the structure of this reserve has not been 
finalised (i.e. the amount of water made available to Indigenous interests for consumptive 
and non consumptive uses and the types of activity allowed), there were concerns about 
the equity of the arrangement. Indigenous people represent 50% of demographic in the 
Katherine region, and as Robbie Dalton, Policy Advisor Northern Land Council asserts, 
"Two percent is clearly not equitable, but we do congratulate the governments’ decision 
to come to the party and negotiate with us about an allocation" The difficulties lie, 
according to interviewees across jurisdictions, with identifying the types of water based 
development Indigenous people seek to undertake, and the volumes of water associated 
with customary and potential economic uses for Indigenous people. 
 
Queensland 
 
“The Indigenous Reserve…When it’s granted it’s likely to be granted as a 
water licence (the same as a water access entitlement, however it’s tied to 
land). Indigenous water, because Indigenous communities usually don’t have 
the capacity to buy that water, they usually don’t have funds to get into the 
market, it’s likely to be a granted as a license, a non tradable license. It’s very 
early days in this policy approach. The thinking behind the policy approach is 
that it’s probably going to be counter-productive to grant  the water as a 
water allocation to an Indigenous entity and should they sell it off the 
Indigenous community are likely to come back in 5 years knocking on the door 
of government saying we want more water…The provisions under the Cape 
York Peninsula Heritage Act are that water is provided to meet the social and 
economic aspirations of the Indigenous community… So far we haven’t had 
any applications for that water yet, it’s provided for in the Mitchell and the 
Gulf Water Resource Plans… [and] …we used a process to determine how 
you assess whether… an application is meeting the social and economic 
aspirations of an Indigenous community.” Tom Crothers, GM Water 
Allocation and Planning, DERM (QLD) 
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An Indigenous reserve was established for Indigenous communities in the Cape York 
Heritage Protection Area and there is the potential to establish Indigenous reserves for 
water under the Wild Rivers Act (2005). In total approximately 1% of mean annual flow 
is reserved for social and economic purposes in Cape York. An equitable process was 
used according to representatives in DERM in calculating the reserve, informed by 
science and the Cape York Land Use Study, the amount of irrigable land held by 
Indigenous communities was multiplied by 10 megalitres (the same method used in the 
Barron WRP). There is debate whether this 1% is adequate, however, without 
understanding the operation of this reserve and the actual volumes of water required to 
meet the social and economic aspirations of communities, this is difficult to assess. The 
aspirations of communities need further development to understand whether the reserve is 
adequate and during interviews the potential for enterprise development was viewed as 
being severely constrained, thereby limiting the scope of water  needed for economic 
purposes (particularly in high preservation zones in declared Wild Rivers areas). Outside 
the Cape, Indigenous interests are accommodated in environmental flows and this is a 
point of contention, as increasingly Indigenous groups see water associated with 
customary use as separate from water for the environment, and are seeking consumptive 
rights.  
 
Some interviewees in Queensland reflected that reserves are not optimal and that using 
market systems to transfer water to special groups (where government can purchase water 
for Indigenous groups) is far more appropriate. Several interviewees offered that 
allocating water from the environment to Indigenous groups for consumptive use was a 
matter for public approval and not for DERM alone to consider. However, underlying 
these issues is whether involvement in water markets is going to be relevant or viable. 
According to Terry Piper, Chief Operating Officer, Balkanu Development Corporation: 
 
"The implications are going to be confined to particular areas, so water 
markets may have big implications for Indigenous people in particular areas, 
like possibly the Mitchell River catchment if there’s more development and 
irrigation [and] in the Gulf. Ultimately there may be some localised areas on 
Cape York where trading of allocations could be possible for irrigation…If 
mining is going to be extracting water there may be some opportunities for 
trading with the Indigenous water allocation, so people might get some 
commercial rights from that...."  
 
In northern Queensland, where irrigation is feasible, Indigenous groups may have 
commercial opportunities, or where there is the potential to sell allocation to mining 
companies this may generate revenue. However, not all communities across the north will 
be presented with such opportunities and the potential to trade is unlikely in the 
foreseeable future in many catchments (in protected areas this again is not relevant). An 
issue of importance is that a number of mining projects have special agreements to access 
significant volumes of water, these often occur in regions like north Queensland where 
there are no competing users and third party impacts from the allocation. Therefore, the 
potential to trade Indigenous allocations with mines to supplement their use is proscribed 
in these circumstances. Terry Piper from Balkanu Development Corporation argued that 
mining companies should be required to pay royalties for water, in the same way they do 
for minerals– but, in saying this he states that any trade or activity must occur in a way 
that is consistent with the cultural values relating of the specific Indigenous community.  
 
So, in Queensland the framework for an Indigenous Reserve exists, but it is difficult to 
assess whether it is adequate because they have not yet been operational. 
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Western Australia 
 
"There are two parts two our native title rights and interests to water, firstly 
there is the involvement in the planning and management of water, and then 
there is the rights to water in the consumptive pool…I understand that the WA 
Government is influenced by the State Solicitors opinion on rights to water 
arising out of native title which view these as only sustenance rights which 
extend only to cultural, ceremonial and hunting purposes... That’s their 
position. We think we can influence them... They [the WA Government] don’t 
have a legal reason to compel them to provide water allocation to traditional 
owners as there is currently no Indigenous legal ownership to water apart 
from rights and interests arising out of native title. We are aiming to build a 
relationship with government, engaging with them, giving them the 
opportunity to consider the reasons for Indigenous rights to the consumptive 
pool."  Nolan Hunter, Deputy CEO, Kimberley Land Council 
 
During interviews in WA, the discussion generally became focused on Indigenous 
involvement in a water market framework in the north. This occurred because of a 
number of reasons. There was the creation of a Kimberley wide regional water plan which 
stimulated thinking about how Indigenous people’s rights and interests fit within WA’s 
water management and planning framework. Also, Indigenous representative groups have 
been pressing for involvement in the consumptive pool in the La Grange draft allocation 
plan. In the Ord Stage 2 expansion, 5% of irrigation land (about 800 ha) was provided to 
native title claimants, with an implied 5% right to access water (approx 20 GL). While 
native title rights are not viewed as extending to commercial rights to water, the thinking 
that is driving debate is that Indigenous people should not be marginalised from access to 
water. Also, there is the potential that a permanent water entitlement could facilitate 
economic development opportunities (through trade or through water based economic 
development).  
 
Interviewees identified that the form of Indigenous involvement in water markets is 
shaped by legislative and institutional requirements. Across the jurisdictions there is 
variation in how issue are defined, but commonly there is required distinction between 
consumptive and non consumptive uses and no trade between the two. Ed Hauck, 
Manager Strategic Projects, Department of Water (WA), describes the various options 
available for Indigenous involvement in WA:  
 
“Some of the options can be characterised in broad terms through concepts 
such as a reserve, a licence that involves traditional uses, or a licence which 
would require some Indigenous business model to be developed and some 
aspirations linked to future water use.  It may be a combination linking a few 
concepts together, including consideration of water aspects in Native Title 
determinations.  But for options to be understood there is a need to define 
terminology so when people talk about, for example - cultural flows, everyone 
understands what is meant.  In some jurisdictions and in some circles the term 
‘cultural flows’ include both commercial use and non-commercial aspects of 
water. We would prefer to distinguish clearly around in-situ values and basic 
rights which include environmental and non-commercial (traditional) uses as 
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separate form commercial use of water. It’s only the commercial use of water 
that is subject to trading and water markets”. 
 
From interviews the concept of an Indigenous reserve is possible and interviewees agreed 
that it could potentially encompass rights in a consumptive pool that may be traded. 
Whether these rights could be permanently traded, or traded without having used them for 
a specific activity, was debated, with no clear answers. Several interviewees emphasised 
that in WA the aspiration of rights to water should be made separate to the objective for 
an establishing an Indigenous reserve in water sharing arrangements. An Indigenous 
reserve could include secure access to drinking water for communities as well as water 
for cultural and commercial purposes (but again a clear delineation between the two to 
prevent trading between consumptive and non consumptive uses). Some interviewees 
believed that rights to water may currently be unpalatable and could jeopardise the 
potential to secure an Indigenous reserve. A reserve is capable of being formed under the 
RIWI Act, but the decision to grant an Indigenous reserve would require government 
approval. The issue of possibly creating a reserve in systems that are fully allocated is a 
difficult one as access to water would likely require water to be procured through market 
mechanisms.  Aside from this, equity considerations would need to be taken into account 
to ensure claims by all stakeholder groups were heard. 
 
There was recognition in interviews in WA that cultural and environmental water are 
becoming confused— the terminology of cultural water is not preferred by the 
Department of Water. Indigenous interests view cultural water as being distinct, being 
linked to ceremony and identity, as well as subsistence. However, a process is being 
sought to create an arrangement that fits within the institutional and legislative framework 
in WA, which is broader than water set aside for cultural purposes, and includes 
obligation to support Indigenous involvement as a separate element in the consumptive 
pool. While there is no legal obligation to support Indigenous involvement in the 
consumptive pool, Indigenous interests assert that broadly this is necessary to involve 
Indigenous people in water planning and to develop economic opportunities around 
water.  
 
Who is a beneficiary to Indigenous involvement? 
 
Identifying who exactly shall hold entitlements or are beneficiaries to any Indigenous 
reserve was raised in interviews as a crucial issue that will require further deliberation. 
For example, some catchments may start in semi arid zones and end in tidal estuary. 
Irrigation based activity may occur only where soil and water quality is highest. But water 
is equally important to all groups along the catchment and extraction may potentially have 
impacts downstream on fishery productivity. Also, the lack of knowledge around 
connection with groundwater also raises implications where extraction from surface water 
impacts soaks or springs for people in other areas. Paul Lane, CEO of the Kimberley 
Institute argues: 
 
"How do you say that those people’s interests are more relevant at the top of 
the Fitzroy than those in the Nyinkina tidal area? It is equally essential to the 
life of the river... If you said to each of the tribal groups on the Fitzroy River 
that 5% of the consumptive pool is yours, what’s 5% in the tidal area? Not 
that it isn’t important to them it’s their country and it has a particular use. But 
the water isn’t worth 2 bob, it can never be used for potable or irrigation or 
anything like that. Trying to have this discussion with people is going to be 
very difficult.” 
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There are many questions that will need to be answered, such as who shall derive the 
benefits of water trading? Is it all groups and people with a connection to a 
catchment? Are there varying degrees of salience that influence the level of income 
one receives? Other questions about an Indigenous Reserve and who should be 
eligible to be a beneficiary included: do Indigenous people have to live on country to 
be a beneficiary or do they have to be accepted by relevant native title representative 
bodies or land councils as a traditional owner? And, will urban Indigenous people 
who are not registered as native title holders or traditional owners miss out on 
involvement or benefits in water markets? A representative of NRETAS elaborates:  
 
 “With the set aside, how do you apportion that? … We are left with options of 
acknowledging those under the ALRA [Aboriginal Land Rights Act] or Native 
Title... It should be broader than that. The tension is where do you draw the 
line? … How do you stop it from being a handout? ... Attaching it to land is 
imperfect because there will be those who miss out because of policies of the 
past. We’re at infancy, Indigenous interests ideas are better formed than 
ours.”  
 
So, defining who are beneficiaries and the structures to administer and distribute 
benefits may follow existing statutory arrangements for Indigenous land tenure. 
However, there may be an opportunity to provide for Indigenous people without 
connection to land. Also, notions of individuals owning parts of entitlements to 
establish businesses and access finance may be considered to promote 
entrepreneurship. Joe Ross, Chair IWPG elaborates:  
 
"...The identification of who actually owns it [water] is difficult even for 
Aboriginal people …The Indigenous Reserve should be held in a common 
good trust and that all social and economic benefits derived from that water 
should go to all Aboriginal people in that specific area. In the NT you would 
probably say…anyone living in those tropical freshwater systems… should be 
able to access that trust.  That’s one model. The other model is specific 
traditional owners wanting to acquire that water and then there are 
individuals. But I think they contravene their real values of what Aboriginal 
people thought of water. Water was always for the common good." 
 
The interviews highlighted that there are different concepts of customary ownership 
across the north, and each region should determine the most effective way to administer 
an Indigenous reserve or entitlement, and in determining beneficiaries. Building on 
existing structures may offer an efficient means to manage these arrangements. However, 
there is the potential to create innovative models that may provide greater flexibility to 
relevant Indigenous groups in pursuing water based economic development. Each model 
should be carefully considered in light of the conditions in each region, as well as the 
institutional and legislative framework in each jurisdiction. 
 
Summary 
 
The potential exists for Indigenous reserves across northern Australia, which could 
encompass water for drinking, cultural and consumptive uses. The amount of water 
required for cultural and consumptive use is important to define and further research may 
provide more information on this. Also, there is a need to clarify potential commercial 
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uses for water and the projected volumes of water required for these activities. Some 
interviewees would prefer to see the use of entitlements to support efficient markets 
(whether now or in the future), but there would need to be a clear separation of 
consumptive and non consumptive uses to prevent trade between the two in jurisdictions 
across the north. Whether native title provides a right to water for commercial purposes is 
uncertain, but native title is generally viewed narrowly to include only hunting and 
customary rights.  
Inter-basin trading and cross-border issues 
 
"It's hard to imagine water trading beyond catchments and schemes– it will 
rarely be any more than that because water is really expensive to pump long 
distances, and there will always be environmental constraints… some mining 
companies might pay, but they aren’t growing mangoes..." Seamus Parker, 
Manager, Legislation and Regulation, Water Reform Project, Council of 
Mayors (SEQ) 
 
Interviewees argued that because systems are generally disconnected across northern 
Australia there would be required significant infrastructure to allow for inter basin 
transfers (and trading). The potential for inter-basin transfer is highly constrained by the 
economics of such activity, with it only likely to occur for high priority and value uses 
such as urban or mining purposes— not for irrigation. Most interviewees found that 
trading is likely to be intra-catchment in the north and occur mostly during the dry. 
Interviewees found that across northern Australia the potential for inter-state trading is 
limited. In the jurisdictions trading can generally only occur within water allocation plan 
areas. Stoeckl et al. (2006) argue that restrictions on inter-basin transfer limit water 
trading as that the most significant gains are to be obtained from transfers to where supply 
conditions are constrained. While there are no policies or legislation that explicitly 
prevent inter-jurisdiction transfers of water, it would require significant planning which 
would be time and resource intensive. The only scope for cross border trading is 
potentially between the NT and WA from the Ord Irrigation District into the Keep 
District on the NT side. However, the likelihood that this will occur in the foreseeable 
future is low. The NT has yet to commence native title and environmental approval 
processes, and there would be required the enactment of complementary legislation in 
both WA and NT to allow for an expansion of the scheme into the Keep. Interviewees 
identified that it would take approximately 10 years before approval and planning 
processes were completed by the NT. Another issue is that the NT does not support the 
use of Genetically Modified cotton, which may be an important crop in Ord Stage 2 and 
may reduce the potential for developing the Keep. 
 
Interviewees identified that across the region Indigenous people would generally be 
opposed to the transfer of water from catchment to catchment because of the negative 
impacts this could have for their country. There were issues raised by interviewees in WA 
and NT around trading from aquifer to aquifer and river to river, on environmental 
grounds. The potential for moving aquatic species around the landscape is of concern, 
particularly in biodiversity rich regions in northern WA and the NT. In Queensland the 
spread of pests (such as Tilapia) is also a concern. 
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The role of mining-related water access and use within the 
NWI framework 
 
"Water management in mining operations needs to be looked at from an 
overall package of outcomes, including those that reflect sustainability and 
community objectives. High levels of water use in the short-term with a view to 
longer-term recovery can be considered viable if conditions imposed under 
mining, environment and water legislation are met.” Ed Hauck, Manager 
Strategic Initiatives, Department of Water (WA) 
 
Mining water use is recognised under the National Water Initiative and considers aspects 
such as regulated/supplemented systems, dewatering, water quality in mines, lack of 
competition and the special nature of some mining operations. A description of mining 
related water use in each jurisdiction is provided next: 
 
• In the NT, water use by mines is not covered by the Water Act, but by the Mine 
Management Act, however, the Bureau of Meteorology may obtain estimates on 
actual water use by mines.  
 
• In QLD, mines are treated as any other user. Where supplemented systems exist, 
mines are required to purchase entitlements and this has been important with 
cases such as the Entscham mine (where a mine had to dilute polluted water 
before discharging it into a river system). In unsupplemented systems mines can 
apply for volumes of water from the general reserve. Some older mines (such as 
Weipa) may be covered by the Special Agreements Act, which provide significant 
rights to extract water (up to 80% of mean annual flow). Water use for the 
petroleum industry is viewed as an emerging issue, though accounting for its use 
is acknowledged as complex.  
 
• Interviewees in WA identified that mines have finite lives and use water that there 
is little competition for, such as deep aquifers. So interviewees argued that while 
mines should be treated as any other user in the RIWI Act, they shouldn’t be 
brought under the NWI reporting framework. A number of major mines operate 
under Special Agreements, which are statutory contracts with the State. Mines 
may collect and discharge water (creating new products under an NWI 
framework), which they may recycle and process through their operations. 
Interviewees identified that mines may have trouble identifying the source of 
water which would make reporting guess work and difficult to manage. 
 
Therefore, mining offers special circumstances recognised in paragraphs 33-34 of the 
NWI which may create challenges in reporting use. Also, mining may create new 
products under an NWI framework which will require changes in entitlements, Will 
Fargher, acting General Manager, Water Markets and Efficiency Group, NWC, suggests 
that in such circumstances: 
 
 “…in the case of mine de-watering or recycling... in areas where there 
is the opportunity for and value in returning water to say the 
environment... to enable this, and facilitate the emergence of what are 
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then essentially new water products, work on the definition of these 
entitlements and conditions on their use may be required.”  
 
Across northern Australia mining projects and their interaction with the NWI framework 
will be dependent on whether mines are operating in the context of an unregulated or 
regulated system. In regulated systems, mines are treated like any other user and markets 
can address allocation issues. In unregulated systems, mines may be the only user, and 
they may create new products, or access resources that are not connected — bringing 
mines under the NWI framework may be challenging in these circumstances.  
 
Non market methods of water allocation 
 
Across the study region non market methods of water allocation predominate outside 
water allocation plan areas— with  the only potential for trade in the Tindall aquifer in the 
NT, some potential in the Gulf and Mitchell catchments and within the two tiered co-
operative system in the Ord. In Queensland, non market methods of allocation (apart from 
the statutory right to stock and domestic) for obtaining a water license exist in some 
unsupplemented systems where no Water Resource Plan’s have been developed. In WA 
and the NT, non-market methods for water sharing are generally applied and this in part 
reflects lower levels of demand for water (especially when compared to south eastern 
Australia). Currently across the north, an application to access water requires a right to 
access land and the development of a reasonable water use proposal.  The proposal is 
reviewed to ensure the water requested is available in the area and that the proposed use is 
in line with conditions of the water licence.  It is this licence that enables a legal right to 
access and use water and this process generally prevents speculation.  
 
Across jurisdictions as the amount of un-allocated water decreases within a specific 
management area, the potential for trade increases. This also identifies the management 
area as a priority for water allocation planning and to formally determine water sharing 
arrangements. Once a limit or a cap is imposed this allows a market to develop. 
Interviewees emphasised that before markets are developed, non-market based 
mechanisms are effective in facilitating allocation and water sharing. Ed Hauck, Manager 
Strategic Projects, Department of Water (WA) elaborates that: 
 
 "A water licensing regime that has conditions of use attached to it is an 
effective way of managing water.  A first-in- first-served licensing system 
works reasonably well up to a certain level of commitment against available 
water. But when you get to  70-80% allocation levels markets start to develop 
and then steps can be taken to transition to a market based approach to water 
allocation.  There is a need for improved  management and monitoring during 
this transition so you don’t get caught unprepared and then wake up one day 
and realise the resource that was under-allocated is now over-allocated 
overnight and be faced with an expensive water recovery issue.  Use of 
transition to market strategies together with water allocation plans and 
licensing systems will help to create water markets when and where required.  
 
None of the plans in northern Australia make explicit the availability of resources to 
purchase back entitlements where there is over-allocation. Only the NT and Queensland 
establish a risk assignment framework to reduce entitlements/licenses if measured water 
levels decrease. In WA there is a broad statutory power to reduce allocations, and the La 
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Grange aquifer draft plan provides for reductions in allocations if there is evidenced 
detriment to the resource. There are drought provisions for allocations in the Ord scheme 
and priority is given to supporting the reliability of irrigators. The use of non market 
measures reflects that outside discrete areas there is low demand for water resources and 
interviewees reflected that it is unlikely that a market regime would be required in the 
foreseeable future. A representative of NRETAS argues that: 
 
 "… What is the point of developing a system if there are only 15-20 licensees? 
In those circumstances would it be more effective to keep the old fashioned 
regulated system? It’s a critical mass thing. Do you design things differently, 
or not at all?”  
 
Interviewees emphasised that while markets may be useful mechanisms in managing a 
scarce resource in the north they may not be so relevant. Despite this, interviewees 
suggested that the benefits of having markets are becoming clearer. In comparing market 
to non market systems interviewees from the Commonwealth and NWC argued that in the 
MDB markets have provided optimal outcomes. Non market methods interviewees 
argued pre-empt the kinds of economic activity occurring on land by restricting 
movement towards highest and best use, and inhibit structural adjustment, reduce area 
under irrigation, create information asymmetry, and potentially have a negative impacts 
on the environment through entrenching inefficient water use. In addition, where water is 
not properly priced, capital values are over-inflated creating a barrier to entry. 
Interviewees also noted that water users have less flexibility where non market methods 
exist (especially in obtaining income or financing).   
 
Non market based methods of water allocation are the most common mechanism for 
water allocation in northern Australia. Without adequate demand jurisdictions have not 
prioritised the establishment of market based allocation across northern Australia, and the 
cost benefit to implementing these arrangements is a disincentive at present. If water 
becomes scarce, jurisdictions emphasised that they shall move incrementally towards 
market-based systems.  
4.3 Constraints to establishing water markets 
 
Interviewees identified a variety of constraints to the establishment of water markets 
across the tropical belt of northern Australia. Many of these constraints are inter-
dependent such as physical constraints (e.g. soil and unconnected systems) and economic 
constraints (e.g. capital and operational costs to developing enterprise and infrastructure). 
While there were commonalities among constraints to the establishment of water markets 
in each jurisdiction, there are slight differences in each. First, the perspective of 
Commonwealth interviewees on constraints is presented, and then the constraints as 
identified by those interviewees from a State/Territory level.  
 
4.3.1 Commonwealth perspective 
 
“The north is seen as a real greenfields site, because allocations are low. We 
have the capacity to do things reasonably well, as we are starting from a low 
base.  Water is generally unmetered, and metering and licensing are needed to 
effectively manage water. Most systems are unregulated apart from the Ord. 
The geography, poor soils and limited potential for water storage mean that 
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there are limited opportunities for large scale economic development. Rivers 
can be roughly divided into perennial, which are aquifer fed in the dry season, 
and seasonally dry rivers.  Direct take from rivers is likely to target perennial 
systems although aquifer water is likely to be the smartest thing to use. There 
is distance from market problems, limited surface water across the dry season 
and it is less likely that governments will subsidise infrastructure such as large 
dams. Floodplain harvesting may be an option but this also has difficulties. 
With limited development opportunities the future will more likely be mosaics 
rather than broad-acre agriculture.” Brendan Edgar, consultant  
 
The constraints for establishing water markets are closely tied to those barriers for water-
based economic development in northern Australia. Interviewees offered that the costs of 
doing business (particularly energy and transport costs) across northern Australia were 
generally seen as prohibitive, especially for irrigated agriculture, where risk was generally 
seen to outweigh returns. In discussing constraints to the establishment of water markets, 
some interviewees identified the north as having a future potential for irrigation 
development. This is in light of changing climatic conditions causing farmers in southern 
Australia to look elsewhere for water, or migrate to a reliable water supply. However, 
before there is sufficient demand to allow for water trading (except where this is already 
occurring), interviewees highlighted general constraints in the north which may prevent 
or hinder their development. These constraints were identified as: (1) physical, (2) 
economic, (3) knowledge gaps, (4) political, and (5) the institutional and legislative 
framework. However, it was acknowledged that while constraints may be generalised 
across the north, barriers to the establishment of water markets will be different from 
catchment to catchment, and are influenced by a variety of factors including nature of 
water use, soil and crop type, and location. 
 
Economic 
 
Interviewees identified that across the north there is a lack of water-based economic 
activity, such as irrigated agriculture. The potential for irrigation is restricted by the 
costs of doing business across the vast distances and fragmentation across northern 
Australia, where transport and energy costs are significant. Also, across northern 
Australia infrastructure is concentrated in centres and there is little water delivery 
infrastructure outside of schemes such as the Ord.  On top of this, there are 
substantive risks to operating in the north such as cyclones, flood and fire. Given 
these factors identifying a business model that creates an attractive risk return ratio is 
complex.  
                                                                                                       
Physical  
 
Interviewees identified physical constraints to the establishment of water markets across 
northern Australia in terms of hydrography, soil type and the prevalence of groundwater 
resources. A lack of connectivity between systems was seen to necessitate pumping water 
across catchments, if not markets would be limited to intra-catchment trading. Soil quality 
is often poor across the north and may not be congruent with water quality. A mosaic 
style of agriculture was proposed across the north by the North Australian Irrigation 
Futures project. In the north, interviewees identified that groundwater resources 
predominate, and that individuals can often access this themselves through bores. 
Individuals may have access to more than one groundwater source. Regulating such 
groundwater extraction requires some form of monitoring and accounting of volumetric 
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entitlement to ensure sustainable yields, and the cost benefit must be carefully considered. 
Also, the characteristics of groundwater resources are not well understood in the north 
particularly recharge which is assessed through historical data which can be highly 
variable. Identifying exactly what a sustainable yield is can be complex. Interviewees 
underscored that seasonal variations in water availability can create challenges in 
planning, as irrigation demand in northern Australia may potentially be most pressing 
when environmental flows are at their highest risk during the late dry season.   
 
Political 
 
“...It seems that there is a strong public dislike for the commoditisation of 
water in the NT, rightly or wrongly. This is a sentiment that the NT 
Department has reflected in strict trading rules, such as non-landholders not 
being able to trade, etc. An additional community sentiment that is reflected by 
the department is the focus on promoting use of water for development, rather 
than trading it onto the market.” Wilf Finn, Manager Water Markets and 
Efficiency Group, NWC 
 
Interviewees from the Commonwealth identified that sentiment existed in some 
communities across the north that was often against the development of water trading 
regimes—this too has been reflected in literature in the context of a case study in 
Katherine, NT, by Straton et al. (2006) and in the MDB by Bjornlund (2004). 
Interviewees offered that this negative attitude to trading was dependent on whether there 
is a pressing need to trade, and where communities have seen the benefits of markets this 
attitude is less prevalent. Also, legislative support in jurisdictions for water trading can be 
weak where markets do not exist or are at a formative stage. However, the NWI is driving 
the intent to pursue (at least in part) the institutional arrangements for market based 
mechanisms for water trading. Some interviewees argued that water reform can be cast as 
resource management to deliver outcomes such as planning, metering, accounting and a 
register– as opposed to associating these as elements of market led reform which may 
have negative connotations in the community and hence be constrained in their 
development.  
 
Knowledge Gaps 
 
Interviewees from the Commonwealth reflected that outside the Ord, surface and 
groundwater resources across northern Australia are not well understood (in particular 
their interaction), reflecting the findings of Stoeckl et al. (2006). In many of these 
catchments there are important ecological and cultural values that must be understood 
and protected. This knowledge gap is not viewed primarily as a constraint to the 
establishment of water markets, but for water sharing and allocation, particularly in 
defining what a sustainable extraction limit in these catchments is. More planning is 
required and because of the limited understanding the relevant departments have 
adopted a precautionary approach to setting extraction limits. Some interviewees 
reflected that funding to undertake research is often constrained as departmental 
resources have been focused on more pressing water issues in southern parts of their 
jurisdiction (in reference to Queensland and WA). However, there are a number of 
initiatives occurring such as the CSIRO Sustainable Yields Project, North Australian 
Land and Water Taskforce and TRaCK which aim to improve knowledge of these 
catchments and aquifers.  
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Institutional and Legislative Framework 
 
"With regard to North Queensland, Indigenous people in the Cape tell me that 
Indigenous access to water for consumptive purposes will be constrained by 
the Wild Rivers proclamations.  While the Cape York Heritage Act allows up 
to 1% of mean annual flow to be available for consumptive use, there is no 
real clear indication how this will be achieved.  I understand that it is 
expected that most will be allocated to Indigenous people and communities but 
as far as I know, neither Indigenous communities know how they would use or 
store this water for use nor does the Queensland Government know how and 
when it will allocate it, nor what conditions will apply to the use of the water.  
Another issue of concern is that some Wild Rivers are within the Cape and 
covered by the Cape York Heritage Act [CYHA].  One percent of mean annual 
flow of these rivers will be made available for consumptive use.  However, 
some Wild Rivers are outside the Cape and not covered by the CYHA.  There 
will be no water available for consumptive use from these river systems.”  
Murray Radcliffe, Senior Manager, Water Planning and Management, NWC 
 
Interviewees in the Commonwealth reflected that the institutional and legislative 
arrangements in northern Australia may constrain the development of water markets. 
In north Queensland, Wild Rivers legislation was seen to limit the creation of 
consumptive pools in high preservation zones in Cape York as well in the Gulf. While 
across northern Australia, native title was viewed as a process that impacted land 
based development and hence the potential for water trading. Interviewees also 
identified that the capacity of departments to adjust to market based allocation varies 
across jurisdictions. Often the movement to market based regimes is limited by 
political constraints and by a lack of resources, especially in jurisdictions where there 
is no pressing need for trading. While interviewees identified the establishment of an 
institutional framework for water markets as being important, the cost benefit to 
establishing a metering and monitoring program, as well as the administrative support 
regime, was identified as a major disincentive for being proactive.  
 
Interviewees identified a variety of constraints across northern Australia to the 
establishment of water markets. Several Commonwealth interviewees asserted that 
these barriers can be overcome with robust arrangements, reflecting an institutional 
perspective to water markets. As Chris Guest from DEWHA argues:  
 
"I don’t see why [water trading can’t occur]. It’s exactly the same as 
anywhere else, you need the two elements, the water management framework 
which specifies what the constraints on extraction are, what allowable 
transfers are on hydrological connectivity; and then you need the register 
system to define the license, manage the transaction and provide information. 
They’re the things you need and once you’ve got those things in place the 
extent of the trade depends on the incentives of buyers and sellers and you 
can’t put that there, all you can do is minimise the transaction costs and 
provide as much certainty as possible. So you remove the role of government 
as a problem, as a source of uncertainty about a trade, and minimise its 
costs." 
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It was evident in interviews that a movement towards robust institutional arrangements is 
an important outcome of reform. However, across northern Australia reforms must be 
considered in light of important land tenure and environmental legislation that may 
constrain the function of markets. Also, the ability for departments to implement 
institutional arrangements for water markets is restricted by institutional capacity, 
political will, resources and need for reform. 
 
Summary 
 
Interviewees from the Commonwealth emphasised the economic, physical, political, 
knowledge, and institutional constraints to the establishment of water markets in northern 
Australia. These are often interdependent, (such as physical and economic constraints), 
and may vary from catchment to catchment, dependent on nature of use, soils and 
distance from market.  
 
4.3.2 Northern Territory 
 
Interviewees identified various constraints to the establishment of water markets in the 
NT context that include: (1) community attitude, (2) physical limitations, (3) knowledge 
gaps, and (4) institutional and regulatory capacity.  
 
Community Attitude and Values 
 
"The only constraint is community attitude. It’s not a constraint as I agree 
with it in this relatively immature stage of development in the NT. It was 
strongly rejected in research done by Stratton and during the water allocation 
process in Katherine. People are against open trading." Ian Lancaster, 
Controller of Water Resources, NRETAS, NT 
 
“Communities to don’t want profiteering with water; they want to know how 
to add value with water to promote regional economic development.” 
Representative NRETAS.   
 
Community perception was viewed as a major constraint to the establishment of water 
markets in the NT, reflecting the perception identified by Straton et al. (2006). 
Interviewees articulated that in their dealings with the public, various concerns about 
water trading had been expressed such as that trading would create speculation and have 
ramifications for local economies and social cohesion. Some interviewees explained that 
this community perception is because markets are at a formative stage and that the 
benefits of trading are not yet tangible.  
 
Physical 
 
As discussed by Commonwealth interviewees, systems in northern Australia are 
unconnected, with a reliance on groundwater throughout the year. There are also poor 
soils which restricts the potential for broad acre irrigation. All these factors constrain the 
potential for water markets by reducing the demand for water, which is a key condition 
identified by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006).  
 
Knowledge Gaps 
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"Our big problem is not efficient allocation. It is a lack of understanding of 
supply and social issues. Markets…might exacerbate these issues." Peter 
Whitehead, project officer NRETAS 
 
A major issue in the NT is that the cultural and ecological values are not well understood 
in many catchments. Also, the volumes of water available for trade have not been suitably 
quantified. There has been little socio-economic assessment to determine likely impacts 
of trading. In defining the limits of trade, the NT government is taking a precautionary 
approach. Until further research can provide more information, knowledge gaps will 
continue to constrain the development of water markets where understanding is limited.  
 
Institutional and Regulatory Capacity 
  
“The major challenge is how you go from a system of allocating for free. 
When do we start charging for water, what’s the floor price? When do we 
allow market pricing to function?” Peter Whitehead, Project Officer, 
NRETAS 
 
“There are big differences between Commonwealth level and our 
understanding, this is true of economic instruments per se. The complexity is 
appreciated but the understanding is not there. We’re often responding to 
desires that we can’t satisfy. There are very few people in the Territory 
government system, probably less than a handful that have half an 
understanding of water trading, maybe 2 or 3.” Representative NRETAS.  
 
According to interviewees in the NT, the implementation of NWI led water reform in the 
NT is constrained by the capacity and resources of the relevant department. However, 
interviewees explained that the relatively low intensity of water based economic 
development impacts the scale of departmental budgets (and hence institutional capacity). 
Interviewees emphasised that the NT is still at a formative stage in developing markets 
and experience is generally consistent with this. Interviewees viewed the rollout of 
markets and relevant institutional arrangements occurring sequentially with the pace of 
demand for water.  
 
4.3.3 Queensland 
 
Interviewees identified four general constraints to the establishment of water markets in 
northern Queensland (1) knowledge gaps (2) physical constraints (3) community attitudes 
and values, and (4) the institutional and legal framework. Some of these constraints are 
tied in to the challenges with developing water-based economies in the region.  
 
Knowledge gaps 
 
"Our biggest constraint is knowledge and data of the water systems up there 
for the development of our modelling. We’re very reticent about introducing 
tradable water allocations into catchments where we don’t have high level of 
confidence in our modelling. In a lot of situations we don’t have a lot of 
gauging stations and we get the best rainfall and runoff data we can,  unless 
we are confident and we have validated the model…we are reticent about 
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introducing tradable water allocations in some plans."  Tom Crothers, GM 
Water Allocation and Planning DERM (QLD) 
 
In Queensland, like all jurisdictions in this study, interviewees identified that the level of 
knowledge on surface and groundwater in the tropical north was not sufficient enough to 
safely support ‘sustainable’ extraction targets. In Queensland, significant work has been 
undertaken on surface water resources across the state, but groundwater resources require 
further planning to ensure sustainable outcomes. The level of resources and time required 
to improve understanding of water resources across northern Australia is significant and 
often more funding is directed to areas where there is pressure on supply. There are a 
number of initiatives occurring to generate more knowledge on northern Queensland’s 
water resources, as well as the ecological and cultural values attached to them.  
 
Physical 
 
“In north Queensland a major constraint is a lack of connectivity, you have 
discrete areas where trade is occurring...They are small unconnected markets 
when contrasted with the large connected Southern Murray Darling Basin...” 
Wilf Finn, Manager, Water Markets and Efficiency Group, at the NWC 
 
Interviewees identified that in northern Queensland there is less congruence of good soils 
and water, river systems lack connectivity and there is more groundwater resources. 
Interviewees emphasised that to date most of the water planning work has been focused 
on surface water in Queensland and that more work was required in understanding 
groundwater, the values attached to groundwater, interaction of groundwater with surface 
water and groundwater dependent ecosystems. Some interviewees also emphasised that 
for groundwater there is required the development of appropriate trading rules and 
regulation for groundwater. The issue of regulating overland flow was not viewed as a big 
issue in the north because of the seasonal wet.  
 
Community attitude and values 
 
"Probably the biggest barriers to trading are cultural– people moving to a 
mindset that water entitlements are a tradable commodity."  Seamus Parker, 
Manager, Legislation and Regulation, Water Reform Project, Council of 
Mayors (SEQ).  
 
"Initially there was a lot of resistance because of concern about speculators– 
the notion that it’s really only a local irrigation community who should own 
water. Most irrigators would agree that’s its alright for those using the water  
to trade among themselves, but they don’t want large companies from outside 
the community accumulating large holdings of their water entitlements...That 
has not happened and the  fear has abated a fair bit, so it is not as big an issue 
as it used to be." Randall Cox, Director, Strategic Water Policy (DERM). 
 
Interviewees in Queensland identified communities were often sceptical and had concerns 
about speculative purchasing of water entitlements (especially the concept of ‘water 
barons’ buying up water coined Kerry Packer syndrome). There have also been 
challenges with individuals accepting the concept that water can be traded. However, 
where communities have been able to trade water, interviewees identified a growing 
support for markets and the outcomes they provide, such as flexibility. In northern 
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Australia (in the study region which does not take in the Mareeba Dimbulah scheme), 
there has been little trading so benefits have generally not been observed. Informing 
communities of the benefits of market based instruments for water delivery will require 
further work. 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional and Legislative Framework 
 
Some interviewees identified certain constraints to the development of water markets in 
the broader institutional and legislative framework.  These included the Wild Rivers Act 
(2005), where declarations identified as high preservation zones for their biodiversity 
values only allow low scale development. Some interviewees argued that these Wild 
Rivers declarations restricted the potential for intensive water extraction, limiting the 
development opportunities for Indigenous people in the region. 
 
Another constraint identified by interviewees is that users leasing water for more than one 
year must undertake a land use plan which may act as a disincentive to such 
arrangements. Also, there was observed by some interviewees a need to increase 
coordination across relevant departments for approvals at a landscape level to maintain 
water quality.  
 
4.3.4 Western Australia 
 
"..Markets mechanisms are best suited to areas where the water available is 
well quantified, unlikely to increase in the future (through new investment in 
water infrastructure or resource re-assessment) and there is competition for 
the water currently available.  It’s hard to expect market mechanisms to work 
when major investments in new water infrastructure are being made at the 
same time.   Current planning to expand the Ord River Irrigation Area, 
emphasises that the region is still very much in a planning and development 
stage. Competition for irrigation water and its reallocation through market 
mechanisms is not a priority at this stage on the Ord." Ian Loh, Senior 
Planner, Department of Water (WA) 
 
"Generally, across north Australia, there’s not a lot of water control through 
irrigation schemes, it’s mainly individuals with their own extraction licenses. 
Consequently, there would be very little mechanism for water trading, apart 
from where you have an irrigation entity, water entitlements and a policy on 
trading. Trading is already a possibility, although it’s limited to the irrigation 
area and there is virtually no support for trading water outside the irrigation 
system district. So a lack of entities that are capable of trading is probably a 
significant hindrance in northern Australia in general." Geoff Strickland, 
CEO Ord Irrigation Co-operative.  
 
"It’s not the constraints it’s the limitations…The more the droughts and the 
changing climate kicks in and the more the migration of agricultural interests 
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from south to north, especially cotton growers and horticultural people [and] 
the MIS [Managed Investment Schemes] schemes…The more they start to 
come up, the more political pressure that comes to bear on governments to 
trade water." Joe Ross, Chair of the IWPG  
 
Interviewee’s identified constraints both broadly to the establishment of water markets in 
WA, as well as those barriers unique the tropical north of the state. Interviewees 
emphasised that constraints may vary from catchment to catchment, that there are 
differences between surface and groundwater, as well as between the water needs 
between different users (such as between hydro, mining, irrigation). Three general 
constraints to the establishment of water markets were identified in the north were: (1) 
economic, (2) land tenure issues, and (3) knowledge gaps.  
 
Economic 
 
"It’s hard to identify the value of water when Governments are investing in the 
water infrastructure to support development.  If you are serious about 
developing (northern Australian) regions you are talking about making major 
government investments. That’s part of what’s behind the recent WA and 
Commonwealth Government’s investment commitments in the East Kimberley.  
Their aim is to put a whole lot more money into the region to make the East 
Kimberley a more viable region." Ian Loh, Senior Planner, Department of 
Water (WA) 
 
The only region where the potential for water trading currently exists in northern WA is 
in the Ord Irrigation Scheme through the two-tiered Co-operative system, where 
according to interviewees no formal trading has occurred to date. The La Grange aquifer 
draft plan is being developed which will set the rules for trading. The Ord irrigation 
business model is predicated on growing fruit and vegetable in the off season as well as 
Managed Investment Schemes (incentive schemes to support forestry plantations) 
targeting domestic and export markets.  However, there are significant costs of business, 
with transport and energy costs tightening margins. Some interviewees raised the point 
that there is significant competition from Asian producers which has downward pressure 
on prices, impacting the viability certain crops and products in the Ord. Interviewees 
suggested that water charges and the price of delivering water reflect this situation. 
According to interviewees, the level of investment in the Ord in infrastructure (especially 
water storage and delivery infrastructure), as well as good soils mean that it is unlikely 
irrigation development is likely to occur outside the Ord without considerable government 
expenditure. 
 
Despite the planned expansion of the Ord (and broadly the East Kimberley) through 
both Federal and State Government support, and the potential to be globally 
competitive, some interviewees identified additional constraints to water markets. For 
example the amount of irrigable land is relatively small in the Ord, with an 
interviewee, Geoff Strickland CEO Ord Irrigation, arguing that: “The Ord irrigation 
area is 15,000 ha, you start comparing that to areas in the East and it’s the size of 
one farm, the whole area is less than Cubbie Station, therefore you can’t fit too many 
farmers in."  The size of the Ord Irrigation area imposes limitations on water markets 
with the number of users restricted. This creates a focus on the surrounding areas and 
also the NT to expand its part of the irrigation scheme. Another constraint is that there 
is competition in the water needs cycle with the hydroelectric scheme. Further, there 
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are risks in the regions such as natural disaster (which the Co-operative structure 
assists with self insurance through its sister asset co-operative) which may have a 
bearing on investment decisions. 
 
 
 
 
Land Tenure 
 
"…Trying to progress development in these areas [across northern Australia] 
is complex and difficult.  Land tenure issues are particularly challenging given 
that the proposed development is usually on vacant crown land or pastoral 
lease. Native title and aboriginal heritage issues must be resolved and 
environmental approvals obtained.  You have to work with government and 
aboriginal interests to get the investigations done, so that the necessary 
approvals can be sought and eventually gained.  Underpinning much of the 
NWI was an assumption that irrigation land was available, water 
infrastructure was in place and further development would be limited.  While 
water may be available, developing most new areas in WA, outside the south 
West, usually require resolution of these native title, land tenure, and 
environmental issues before development can proceed.  There can be long 
lead times, if we don’t know much about these issues when development 
planning commences." Ian Loh, Senior Planner, Department of Water (WA) 
 
Interviewees emphasised that a significant part of land in WA is vacant crown land or 
pastoral, and dealing with that land requires significant process such as those prescribed 
under the Native Title Act. The development of Ord Stage 2, culminating in the Ord Final 
Agreement with native title holders represented by MG Corp took several years to come 
to fruition. The potential for establishing land based development outside towns where 
land is already scheduled, such as Kununurra, is highly constrained. Understanding how 
the Native Title Act interacts with water and the extent of native title rights are important 
issues and there are initiatives occurring in WA to help overcome this important 
knowledge gap.  
 
Knowledge gaps 
 
"There are perceptions that there is an abundance of water in the north. This 
may hamper whether markets become operational as there may be a 
perception that…trading shouldn’t be required…An abundance of water 
doesn’t [necessarily] translate to [more] water for consumptive use." 
Representative, Department of Water (WA) 
 
Interviewees emphasised an awareness of the complex relationship between water and the 
broader environment. Creating a consumptive pool can have implications on biodiversity 
as well as socio-cultural impacts. Understanding surface and groundwater resources 
through scientific and technical assessment and minimising third party impacts through 
consultation and engagement with stakeholders requires significant expenditure. 
Interviewees underscored that once water plans are developed there is required an 
ongoing process of monitoring, particularly if the Department of Water seeks to achieve 
sustainable use of water resources. Across northern WA, there has been relatively little 
pressure on most water resources and the scientific understanding is generally not 
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sufficient. Departmental expenditure for planning and monitoring has been focused on the 
south West of the state where there are pressing supply issues. A draft allocation plan has 
been prepared in the La Grange aquifer south of Broome, a plan has been developed for 
the Ord and there is a Kimberley wide regional plan that sets the strategic parameters for 
water based development. However, several interviewees highlighted that existing 
knowledge of water resources in the north, in particularly groundwater, required more 
work to understand the extent of the resource and to define the ecological and cultural 
values present, before water markets can even be considered. 
 
Groundwater is a significant component of water resources in Western Australia, 
including the north. Understanding groundwater, its draw points, flow and interaction 
with surface water, as well as the impact of extraction on ecological and cultural values 
requires significant investigation. Developing this knowledge is time and resource 
intensive, requiring fieldwork and modelling, and across the north there has insufficient 
resources devoted to this task and is not comprehensive. Further, there must also be a 
capacity to review modelling and update planning. For example, Ian Loh, Senior Planner, 
Department of Water (WA) talks of some of the challenges with groundwater water 
planning and management: 
 
"Groundwaters were always assumed to have a large storage and they would 
respond fairly slowly to climate change, but some superficial aquifers have 
responded dramatically to low rainfall over the last 10 years [in the south 
West]. As our understanding of the ecosystems dependent on these superficial 
aquifers has improved, the need to provide for variable groundwater 
extraction rates has increased…  Considerable knowledge of the groundwater 
system and the response of any dependent ecosystem during periods of 
drought are required to develop the appropriate restriction policies and 
drought management strategies.  As you go down an NWI path of issuing 
perpetual licenses, the level of understanding of groundwater systems must be 
substantial.  Our understanding of many groundwater systems, especially in 
the north, is very limited.  This agency has been concerned about the push to 
issue long term licenses and effectively allow markets to reallocate rights, 
when the fundamental knowledge of the aquifer’s behaviour is so limited. 
However, I don’t think the pressure to trade groundwater entitlement has been 
very great to date, and has been very limited in the north of WA ..."  
 
Managing groundwater presents many challenges for planners and developing trading in 
the context of groundwater is complex, particularly when the level of understanding of 
volumes of water available is incomplete. To trade in groundwater, proponents would 
have to undertake scientific assessments to reduce the potential for environmental impact. 
As land and water remain bundled, interviewees raised the difficulty of groundwater 
trading in such a system. The expense of developing infrastructure to trade would be 
prohibitive in most cases, unless there is the development of large scale projects such as 
to use a recent example a ‘gas hub’ which would increase demand for water significantly 
in a given location.  Some interviewees described how individuals may be able to access a 
number of aquifers on their land, and there may be difficulty in identifying connected 
resources. Finally, some interviewees argued that while trading in groundwater may be a 
useful mechanism in allowing reallocation to highest and best use, the level of trading is 
likely to be restricted.  
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4.3.5 Summary 
 
In each jurisdiction in northern Australia, interviewees identified a variety of constraints 
to the establishment of water markets which apply generally to the north. While each 
constraint may vary in importance from catchment to catchment, most of these barriers 
are interdependent and often rely on the potential for water based economic development 
in each region. The constraints raised by interviewees include economic barriers, 
knowledge gaps on the resource (which could impact sustainability), physical barriers 
(i.e. a lack of connectivity among rivers or reliance on groundwater), and community 
values and attitudes against water trading. In the NT, institutional and regulatory capacity 
at this formative stage in the development of markets was seen to be a barrier to the 
establishment of water markets. In WA, land tenure issues were seen to restrict the 
potential for water markets. In Queensland the broader institutional and regulatory 
framework in the north restricted the potential for water markets by prescribing low scale 
development in declared Wild Rivers high preservation zones (although it is 
acknowledged that there is currently little demand pressure on these systems). A summary 
of the constraints by jurisdiction is provided in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Summary of constraints to the establishment of water markets in jurisdictions 
in northern Australia and from a Commonwealth perspective 
 
Commonwealth NT QLD WA 
 
Physical Physical Physical Land tenure issues 
 
Knowledge gaps Knowledge gaps  
 
 
Knowledge gaps 
 
Knowledge gaps 
 
 
Institutional and 
legislative framework 
 
 
Institutional and 
regulatory capacity 
 
 
 
Institutional and 
legislative framework 
  
 
Economics 
 
 
 
 
Political 
 
Community attitude 
and values 
 
Community attitude 
and values 
 
 
Economics 
   
 
Interviewees identified that physical limitations will create discrete markets that generally 
remain unconnected from other systems, but this is dependent on the economics and the 
value of the use (mining v irrigation). The costs of doing business are a major constraint 
in the progress of water based development in the tropical north and governments will 
need to play an important role to support economic development in the region (through 
investment in infrastructure and subsidies).  
 
Knowledge gaps were viewed as being a constraint that research (some of which is 
occurring) can help overcome by bringing understanding on issues such as groundwater 
resources (i.e. actual reserves and interaction with surface water), ecological and cultural 
values. Such knowledge supports sustainable outcomes into the future but may be 
constrained by funding as more resources are focused on more urgent water issues in 
southern Australia.  
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Institutional and regulatory capacity in jurisdictions such as the NT offer constraints in 
implementing reform but the situation reflects the level of water based development in the 
jurisdiction. An institutional and legislative framework that constrains water based 
development in the north and hence the potential for water use (such as Wild Rivers) 
would require legislative change, but again there are a variety of other constraints that are 
more pressing according to interviewees, such as economic and physical barriers. 
Interviewees reflected that land tenure issues such as native title processes require a 
supportive framework between government, proponents and Indigenous groups, to 
facilitate agreements around water to improve outcomes for these stakeholders. Where 
communities have not engaged in water trading, community attitudes and values and 
political considerations were viewed as barriers to the establishment of institutional 
arrangements for water markets. But most interviewees argued that as communities see 
the benefits of trading this sentiment will diminish.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
The institutional and regulatory framework that governs water allocations across the three 
jurisdictions have developed independently to meet the specific needs of each jurisdiction 
and are influenced by physical features, economic considerations, political climate, 
community attitudes, and the existing legal and institutional framework. While the 
potential for water markets is generally constrained, most interviewees identified that 
commitments made under the NWI have created a platform and an intent that is helping to 
drive the development of new institutions and regulation for managing water. Most 
interviewees argued that the development of these NWI-led institutional arrangements is 
likely to bring about improved water resource management in northern Australia, and that 
each State/Territory can decide what is important (in light of financial limitations) and 
implement reforms accordingly.  
 
The argument that to successfully implement innovations such as water markets (in this 
case the NWI) there must be some consideration of features present in the particular 
institutional setting was contested by some interviewees. In this viewpoint, they argued 
that a common institutional approach as laid out in the NWI is optimal. However, several 
features in northern Australia were identified that would affect the institutional 
arrangements such as (1) seasonal climatic regime, (2) a low population (3)  Indigenous 
representation and values, (4) unique land tenure regime and (5) for the foreseeable 
future, highly circumscribed economic development opportunities.  
 
Interviewees stated that the need for water reform, especially in terms of water markets, is 
not a priority. However, interviewees also reflected that the NWI-led reform agenda is 
driving best practice (or at least improving awareness) in water planning, Indigenous 
access to water, water entitlement registers, accounting and metering. A common view 
was not to replicate a Murray-Darling Basin over-allocation of water, and instead adopt a 
precautionary approach to water planning and management – this reflects the findings in 
the north of Stoeckl et al. (2006) and Straton et al. (2006) who support a precautionary 
approach to planning and allocation to consumptive uses where systems are not well 
understood in light of the potential social and ecological risks. There was also a strongly 
held view by some respondents for Indigenous aspirations in both economic development 
and water management. The form of what this role should be and its implications for 
water markets is still being debated.   
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A variety of constraints to the establishment of water markets in northern Australia are 
primarily related to physical features (such as unconnected systems) which will create 
fragmented and discrete markets— this may create barriers to economic development. 
Some constraints, such as knowledge gaps can be overcome with sufficient time and 
resources. Other constraints such as community attitudes and values, that include 
concerns about the consequences of water trading, need to be answered and will require 
adequate community consultation.  
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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
 
The purpose of this phase of the research project is to analyse current institutional 
arrangements and constraints affecting the establishment of water markets across 
tropical Queensland, Northern Territory and Western Australia. 
 
 
1. Is water trading possible in your State or Territory? 
 
a. If so, have there been any trades in the northern region of your jurisdiction? 
 
2. What has been your experience with the development of water markets and 
trading in the tropical north of your State or Territory? (i.e. North East Coast, 
Gulf of Carpentaria, Timor Sea Drainage Divisions) 
 
3. Does your Government have formal policy/ies on water trading? 
 
a. Is there policy for water markets and trading specifically for the tropical north 
of your State/Territory? 
 
4. Do other stakeholders have policies or just advocacy positions? 
 
5. In establishing water trading and markets in northern Australia are there 
particular factors and needs to be taken into account? 
 
a. If so, how have institutional and regulatory arrangements been adapted to the 
needs of these regions?  
 
i. Do you think these adaptations are adequate? Why? 
ii. If no, in your opinion what other factors should be taken into 
account? 
 
b. Have you drawn any lessons from the Murray Darling Basin water market?  
 
6. Is your jurisdiction meeting NWI obligations for the introduction of water 
trading?  
 
a. In your opinion, how does your jurisdiction compare to other jurisdictions in 
northern Australia in implementing the market-based reforms expected by the 
NWI? 
b. Are there particular circumstances that have affected the pace of water market 
establishment in your jurisdiction? 
c. Do you have performance indicators or any other metrics to evaluate your 
progress in meeting the water reform agenda? 
 
7. From a government perspective, are there factors that presently constrain the 
establishment of water markets in the tropical north of your State/Territory? If 
so, what are these constraints/barriers? 
 
a. What actions have been taken by State/Territory government and relevant 
authorities to overcome these barriers?  
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b. Has the Commonwealth played a role in overcoming constraints? 
 
8. Are there any inter-basin trading and/or cross-border issues in relation to water 
trading in your jurisdiction? 
 
a. Does your jurisdiction consider trading out of basins to be unacceptable, or is 
restricting this viewed as a constraint on trade? 
 
9. What do you regard to be the most effective method of regulating water 
trading in northern Australia? 
 
a. Would you consider the implementation of exit fees on the sale of water 
entitlements as a legitimate or useful method of regulating water trading? 
 
10. In your State/Territory, what is the role of mining-related water access and use 
within the NWI framework? 
 
11. What non-market methods of water allocation exist in urban, rural and remote 
areas? 
 
a.      How do you think these compare with market-based mechanisms? 
b. Would native title customary rights under s211 of the NTA fall into such a      
category? 
 
12. What are the implications of water markets for Indigenous people in tropical 
northern Australia? 
 
a. How do you see the involvement of Indigenous interests in the water 
allocation process? 
 
i. Are there formal consultative mechanisms to incorporate Indigenous 
stakeholders in planning and policy development? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: List of Interviewees 
 
 
Interviewees Department/Role Date and Time of Meeting Location 
    
    
Peter Whitehead NRETAS 16th Feb 10 am  Darwin 
Ian Lancaster NRETAS 16th Feb 3 pm Palmerston 
Anon. NRETAS 27th Feb 10 am Darwin 
Robbie Dalton Northern Land Council 4th March 10 am  Darwin 
Tom Crother, Aaron Stasi, Paul 
Hausler DERM QLD 9th March 9:30 am  Brisbane 
Scott Buchanan DERM QLD 9th March 11am Brisbane 
Randall Cox DERM QLD 9th March 12:30 pm  Brisbane 
Anna Stratton CSIRO 10th March 11 am (EST) Phone 
Anon.  Sunwater 10th March 2 pm  Brisbane 
Seamus Parker Council of SEQ Mayors 12th March 10 am Brisbane 
Terry Piper 
Balkanu Enterprise Development 
Corporation 17th March 10:30 am Cairns 
Anon DERM QLD 18th March 9 am  Cairns 
Carolyn Hills and Ian Loh Department of Water (WA) 23rd March 11:00 am (WST) Perth 
Gary Kairn Kimberley Land Council 31st March, 9 am  Broome 
Dave Munday Department of Water (WA) 31st March 2 pm  Broome 
Paul Lane and Howard Pedersen Kimberley Institute 31st March 3 pm Broome 
Gary Scott Environs Kimberley 1st April 4 pm Broome 
Joe Ross Chair IWPG and NALWT 2nd April 4 pm Broome 
Geoff Strickland CEO Ord Irrigation Co-operative 6th April 9:30 am Kununurra 
Des Hill and Sonia Leonard MG Corporation 6th April 10 am Kununurra 
Anon Department of Water (WA) 7th April 3 pm Kununurra 
Anon Department of Water (WA) 8th April 9 am  Phone 
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Murray Radcliffe, Will Fargher, Wilf 
Finn National Water Commission 15th April 10 am Canberra 
Chris Guest DEWHA 15th April 2 pm Canberra 
Brendan Edgar Consultant LWA 15th April 3 pm  Phone 
Richard McLoughlin DEWHA 16th April 9 am Canberra 
Isabelle Arnaud DEWHA 16th April 12 pm Canberra 
Anon Water Policy Specialist 21st April 3pm  Phone 
John Childs DRMAC and TRaCK 21st April 3:40 pm  Phone 
Jim Donaldson LWA 22nd April 12 pm Brisbane 
Nolan Hunter Kimberley Land Council 23rd April 3 pm (CST) Phone 
Gayle Milnes DEWHA 29th April 2pm (CST) Phone 
Ed Hauck Department of Water (WA) 30th April 10:30 am (CST) Phone 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
